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ABSTRACT 
 
A CONTEMPORARY TREND ANALYSIS OF KENTUCKY STATE POLICE 
VEHICULAR PURSUIT-RELATED COLLISIONS AND INJURIES 
Frederick A. Williams Jr. 
May 10, 2019 
 
This study investigates the trends in vehicular pursuits conducted by the Kentucky 
State Police (KSP) over time (i.e., years 2009 - 2017).  Additionally, predictors for 
collisions and injuries were examined.  The issues surrounding vehicular pursuits center 
on officer safety and agency liability concerns with the most significant of these being 
collisions and injuries.   
This study contains several primary areas.  Chapter two includes a review of the 
literature surrounding the area of vehicular pursuits.  Specifically, it reviews definitions 
pertinent to this study, legal aspects concerning pursuits, major empirical studies 
conducted on pursuits and specific risks associated with pursuit practices.  This section 
was utilized to develop the themes for analysis.  Chapter three covered the methodology 
for this study.  In this chapter, the measures for analysis were presented and the analysis 
plan was thoroughly explained.  The analysis plan involved three steps: Step 1:  
Descriptive Statistics; Step 2: Trend Analysis and Step 3: Logistic Regressions.  The 
trend analysis employs a Bayesian process utilized by the Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC).  This process is used to examine risk behaviors over time and was 
vi 
 
ideal for conducting the type of analysis required for this study.  Chapters 4 presents the 
results of this study.  The results indicate an upward trend in pursuit-related collisions 
and injuries between 2009 and 2017.  The results determined that pursuits involving three 
or more units had the potential to increase the likelihood of collisions while the use of tire 
deflation devices was found to decrease the risk of collisions.  No predictors were found 
significant for injuries.   
Chapter 5 contains the discussion, policy recommendations, study limitations, 
recommendations for future studies and conclusions.  The policy recommendations 
should be generalizable across law enforcement agencies of similar disposition to the 
KSP.  Recommendations are presented in the areas of intervention techniques, pursuit 
policy development, compliance with pursuit policy, and the development of pursuit 
training programs.  Lastly, this study concludes with limitations and conclusions which 
focus on suggestions for improvement and provisions for making any future studies 
conducted on KSP pursuit data more robust.     
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Police vehicular pursuits are currently understudied.  The risk associated with 
pursuits remains one of the topmost pressing concerns for a law enforcement agency.  Of 
those risks, pursuit-related collisions (i.e., collisions) and the resulting pursuit-related 
injuries (i.e., injuries) remain a chief liability concern for law enforcement agencies 
(Kappeler, 2006).  Collisions are as much an officer’s safety concern as they are a public 
safety concern for the Kentucky State Police (KSP).  Historically, fifteen (48.3%) of the 
thirty-one (31) Fallen KSP Troopers died as a result of a collision involving a vehicle.  
Eight (8) were the result of emergency response driving and one (1) fatality involved a 
pursuit-related collision (KSP, 2018).  While the KSP collects pursuit data annually, a 
trend analysis of this data has not been conducted to examine trends across a large span 
of years.  This type of analysis will be useful to administration and academia in 
understanding the current state of pursuit operations, officer safety and any potential 
liability concerns requiring attention.  
Traffic collisions are the leading cause of death for law enforcement officers 
(LEOs) (Gustafson, 2015).  Each collision and resultant damage, injury or fatality has a 
cost.  As stated in a 2010 estimate, each officer fatality costs approximately $1.7 million 
(Gustafson & Cappitelli, 2010).  This does not include the emotional toll stemming from 
the loss.  President Obama’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing (2015) conducted a 
review of law enforcement fatalities over the last two decades.  This report also 
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concluded that more LEOs were killed by traffic collisions than by firearms (National 
Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund, 2014).  This is consistent with the KSP data.  
Historically, thirteen (13) (41.9%) of thirty-one (31) troopers were killed from gunfire 
(KSP, 2018).  Further, Wolfe, Rojek, Alpert, Tiesman, and James (2015) stated that for 
every LEO traffic-related fatality, more than 200 other LEOs are injured in collisions.  
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) (2011) reported that 
pursuit-related officer deaths increased between 1980 and 2008.  Some authors suggest 
that as much as 40 percent of pursuits end in collisions (Alpert & Anderson, 1996; Auten, 
1994; Falcone, Wells, & Charles, 1992).  Also, there are around 300 deaths involving by-
standers, suspects or the police which occur annually because of pursuits (Masters et al., 
2011).  As evidenced by these statistics, collisions clearly present a significant officer 
safety, public safety, and agency liability concern. 
Today, many law enforcement agencies, especially urban departments, have 
begun to move away from allowing their LEOs to engage in vehicular pursuits.  Many 
local agencies have enacted restrictive policy prohibiting pursuits due to the dangers 
involved and liability concerns over this practice.  Eighty-five (85%) percent of local 
agencies, seventy-three (73%) percent of sheriff’s offices and only thirty-seven (37%) of 
state police and highway patrol agencies had restrictive pursuit policy (LEMAS, 2013; 
Reaves, 2017).  These restrictive policies often place limitations on when and how to 
pursue such as only permitting vehicular pursuits for certain offenses or in certain 
circumstances.  State police and highway patrol agencies are among the last holdouts 
regarding the establishment of extremely restrictive pursuit policy but even they have 
developed comprehensive policies to protect their agencies, troopers and the public.  
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Currently, the decision to pursue is left to the LEO in about thirty (30%) percent of state 
police and highway patrol agencies as compared to seventeen (17%) percent of sheriffs’ 
offices and thirteen (13%) of local police departments (LEMAS, 2013; Reaves, 2017).     
Likewise, academic research has become aware of the collision risks associated 
with pursuits.  Most of the academic research conducted on pursuits addresses the danger 
involved and potential ramifications thereof (Hicks, 2006).  For instance, 6,000 fatal 
collisions occurred between 1996 and 2015.  This means on average about 355 people die 
as a result of collisions annually.  The number of fatalities seemed to peak at round 400 
annually during 2006 and 2007 (Reaves, 2017).  Many of the risk factors related to 
pursuit-related collisions will be examined thoroughly within this study.          
Vehicular pursuits are filled with difficult decisions for any LEO involved.  The 
decision to initiate and/or continue a pursuit can be difficult for a variety of reasons 
including concerns over policy, liability and public safety.  This study will be 
accomplished in three primary stages.  First, a review of the literature encompassing 
vehicular pursuits, pursuit-related collisions, risk factors, pursuit law and legal liability, 
and factors contributing to pursuit-related collisions.  Second, a quantitative analysis will 
be conducted utilizing KSP pursuit data collected from the KSP between the years of 
2009 to 2017.  The primary means of examination will be trend analysis of the collisions 
and injuries occurring over the time span of this dataset.  Further, analysis will be 
conducted to gain an understanding of the correlates of these collisions and injuries.  
Lastly, findings and limitations will be presented, policy recommendations will be made, 
and conclusions will be drawn.   
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It is important to understand all aspects of vehicle pursuits and the factors 
surrounding them.  The literature review will address each of the areas mentioned 
previously in detail.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
Definitions 
 
To properly examine vehicular pursuits, it is essential that a clear definition of a 
vehicular pursuit, pursuit-related collision, and pursuit-related injury be established.  It 
may seem easy to classify all police chases as pursuits, but pursuits must meet certain 
criteria before they are officially classified as a vehicular pursuit.   Several definitions are 
available to clarify the criteria.  Nugent, Connors, McEwen, & Mayo (1990) noted that 
any pursuit definition should include these four components:  1) Any pursuing law 
enforcement officer should be in a patrol vehicle clearly identified as a patrol vehicle; 2) 
The suspect should be clearly aware of the officer’s intention for them to stop and fail to 
comply with these instructions; 3) the rationale for the pursuit may include traffic or 
criminal violations; 4) vehicle speed may vary throughout the duration of the pursuit. 
Multiple definitions of pursuits encompass these different aspects.  For instance, 
Alpert and Anderson (1986) defined vehicular pursuits as “an active attempt by a law 
enforcement officer operating an emergency vehicle to apprehend alleged criminals in a 
moving motor vehicle, when the driver of the vehicle, in an attempt to avoid 
apprehension, significantly increases his or her speed or takes other evasive action.” 
(Alpert & Anderson, 1986, p. 5).  NHTSA defines police pursuit as follows:  
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A police pursuit is defined as an event initiated by a law enforcement officer 
operating an authorized motor vehicle giving notice to stop (either through the use 
of visual or audible emergency signals or a combination of emergency devices) to 
a motorist who the officer is attempting to apprehend, and that motorist fails to 
comply with the signal by either maintaining his/her speed or taking evasive 
action to elude the officer’s attempt to stop the motorist. A pursuit is terminated 
when the motorist stops, the attempt to apprehend is discontinued by the officer, 
or at the direction of a competent authority.  A police pursuit related death is 
defined as all fatalities recorded in a pursuit related crash. (Hutson, Rice, Chana, 
Kyriacou, Chang, & Miller, 2007, p. 279).   
Nugent et al. (1990) define vehicular pursuit as the following:  
An active attempt by a law enforcement officer on duty in a patrol car to 
apprehend one or more occupants of a moving motor vehicle, providing the driver 
of such vehicle is aware of the attempt and is resisting apprehension by 
maintaining or increasing his speed or by ignoring the law enforcement officer’s 
attempt to stop him (Nugent et al., 1990, p.1).   
Although very similar to the Nugent et al. (1990) vehicular pursuit definition, the 
NHTSA (2004) definition will be adopted for the purposes of this study.  This definition 
is preferred because it offers a more complete depiction of the characteristics of most 
pursuits; also, it is better aligned with operations within the KSP. 
The NHTSA (2004) definition contains several characteristics which are 
important to include in any pursuit definition.  First, they specifically use the “authorized 
motor vehicle” (Hutson et al., 2007, p. 279).  This is important because pursuits should 
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not be initiated by any LEO who is not driving an authorized motor vehicle.  When 
pursuits are initiated by LEOs in vehicles that are not easily distinguishable as marked 
patrol vehicles, the suspect may claim that they were not certain they were being 
subjected to a lawful stop as justification for not complying.  Second, NHTSA (2004) 
uses the phrase “giving notice to stop (either through the use of visual or audible 
emergency signals or a combination of emergency devices)” (Hutson et al., 2007, p. 279).  
KSP policy requires the use of both audible and visual indicators during a pursuit.  
Lastly, NHTSA (2004) included the phrase “motorist fails to comply with the signal by 
either maintaining his/her speed or taking evasive action to elude the officer's attempt to 
stop the motorist.” (Hutson et al., 2007, p. 279).  This is also important because if the 
suspect begins to slow, they can make an argument that they were preparing to stop or 
intended to stop.  Conversely, if the suspect maintains or increase their speed or takes an 
evasive action, no such argument can be made.  This is also important in articulating that 
a pursuit occurred.  The LEO and/or the prosecution must be able to establish that the 
suspect was aware of the LEO’s intent to stop them and consciously ignored their 
attempts.  For these reasons, the NHTSA (2004) definition is considered more complete 
than Alpert and Anderson (1986). 
For this study, negative outcomes are considered pursuit-related collisions and 
pursuit-related injuries.  Pursuit-related collisions will be referred to as collisions and 
pursuit-related injuries will be referred to as injuries.  Collisions and injuries may be 
referenced separately in this study however these terms are not considered independent of 
one another.  Collision often result in injuries and injuries rarely occur without collisions.   
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Collisions are defined as any collision involving any participants of a vehicular 
pursuit as defined by NHTSA (2004).  NSC (2007) provides the following definition for 
collision accident: 
A collision accident is a road vehicle accident other than an overturning accident 
in which the first harmful event is a collision of a road vehicle in-transport with 
another road vehicle, other property or pedestrians (p. 35). 
The NSC definition will be utilized for this study because it excludes the 
requirement that the characteristics of the collision include “resulting in injuries, death 
and/or loss of property” (p. 26).  This is not a requisite for this study which only requires 
that the first harmful event occur.  Collisions as referenced in this study, do not include 
legal intervention which occurs when a LEO intentionally drives their patrol vehicle into 
the suspect vehicle with the intent to terminate the pursuit.  NSC (2007) defines legal 
intervention as: “Legal intervention is a category of deliberate intent in which the person 
who acts or refrains from acting is a law-enforcing agent or other official” (p. 18).  
Further, this definition falls in agreement with KSP pursuit policy. 
Injuries are considered any injury resulting from a vehicular pursuit as defined by 
NHTSA (2004).  These injuries may be sustained by the suspect operating the vehicle 
being pursued, by the pursuing LEO, a passenger in either the pursuit vehicle or vehicle 
being pursued or an uninvolved by-stander.  NSC (2007) defines injury as: “An injury is 
bodily harm to a person” (p. 16).  Injury also includes fatal injury and fatality.  NSC 
(2007) defines fatal injury as: “A fatal injury is any injury that results in death” (p. 17).  
Fatality is defined as “…any death resulting from a fatal injury” (NSC, 2007, p. 17).  
Both definitions will serve as the basis for this study. 
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Legal Aspects 
 
In addition to safety concerns, liability stemming from pursuit-related collisions 
are a major concern to law enforcement agencies.  For this reason, it is also important to 
examine the laws related to vehicle pursuits and legal liability.  Most jurisdictions 
recognize violations of traffic law as prima facie proof of negligence (Kappler, 2006).   
Others justify a pursuit based upon the circumstances classifying it as an emergency.  
However, for purpose of immunity for the LEO, some courts do not see the violation of 
the law or potential violation of a law as an emergency for the purposes of justifying the 
pursuit.  Consequently, police negligence is determined by the circumstance surrounding 
the LEOs violation of a traffic regulation, their use of the pursuit vehicle and the severity 
of the suspect’s offense.   The Michigan Supreme Court ruled in Fisher v. City of Ann 
Arbor (1983) that for statutory immunity to apply, the LEO must reasonably believe an 
emergency exists.  The California Supreme Court in Kisbey v. California (1984) added 
further credence to the argument for immunizing the police for involvement in pursuits.  
Regardless of numerous and varied decision of state courts, often time’s the potential for 
legal liability exists, and litigation ensues (Kappler, 2006). 
 In situations where LEOs are not afforded sovereign discretionary, or statutory 
immunity, the idea of negligence is often used by state courts to determine liability.  
Negligence is established by proving the existence of a duty and observing that this duty 
has been breached (Kappler, 2006).  Under these circumstances, the principles of duty, 
breach of duty and proximate cause are applied to policing situation where injury occurs.  
The use of negligence theory has resulted in the emergence of principles of law on police 
liability for negligence in the operation of emergency vehicles.  The principles are very 
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similar to the requirements of negligence.  They are:  1) duty of care; 2) breach of 
reasonableness; 3) proximate cause; and 4) actual injury or damage (Kappler, 2006).     
Legal liability not only stems risk but also from potential violations of the 
constitutional rights of the suspect being pursued.  When these types of constitutional 
violations occur, legal remedies may be pursued.  This may result in a lawsuit in which a 
law enforcement agency may be found at fault and required to pay a substantial penalty.    
Certain constitutional amendments have been deemed to pertinent to police 
vehicular pursuits.  Specifically, the 4th and 14th amendments have been found to be 
independently applicable in such cases involving pursuits.  The application of the 4th 
Amendment to vehicular pursuits was addressed in Brower v. County of Inyo (1989). 
Brower was involved in a high-speed pursuit while driving a stolen vehicle.  Brower 
subsequently crashed into a police roadblock with claimed his life.  In this case, it was 
determined that when a LEO initiates a pursuit, it does not constitute a seizure under the 
4th Amendment.  Similarly, the Supreme Court ruled that the termination or intent to 
terminate an individual’s freedom of movement by a governmental entity does not 
constitute a violation of their 4th Amendment protections (Hicks, 2006; Pipes & Pape, 
2001).   
The 14th Amendment protects against deprivation of a person’s life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law or equal protection under the law (Kappeler, 
Kappeler, & Del Carmen, 1993).  Some 14th Amendment issues were addressed in 
County of Sacramento v. Lewis (1998).  In this case, a 16-year-old Philip Lewis was 
riding as a passenger on a motorcycle driven by 18-year-old Brian Willard.  Willard 
committed a traffic violation and fled from a Sacramento County Sheriff’s Deputy when 
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they attempted to stop Willard.  A pursuit ensued which reached speeds of 100 mph.  The 
pursuit ended with Willard causing the motorcycle to tip over and Lewis being struck and 
killed by the pursuing patrol vehicle.  The litigants claimed that the cyclist’s due process 
was violated during the high-speed pursuit through deliberate and reckless indifference to 
life.  The Ninth Circuit Court ruled the deputy was not liable for Lewis’ death by 
showing “deliberate indifference” and that a violation of the 14th Amendment had not 
occurred because there was no intent to cause harm separate from the legitimate intent to 
effect an arrest (Hess, Orthmann, & Cho, 2014; Pipes & Pape, 2001).   
The Supreme Court applied the “shocks-the-conscience” test to pursuit cases for 
more than a half a century.  Rochin v. California (1952) was established as the 
benchmark case for this standard.  The Supreme Court recognized that LEOs are not 
responsible for pursuits and therefore are not responsible for collisions that result from 
them.  They ruled that the blame lied with the fleeing suspect who created the dangerous 
situation by failing to stop when instructed and fleeing from the police (Hess et al., 2014).  
In addition to constitutional concerns, considerable legal liability lies in the 
manner and type of force used to end a pursuit.  Patrol vehicles are large heavy pieces of 
machinery capable of traveling at very high speeds.  Virtually any use of the patrol 
vehicle to physically stop a fleeing suspect can be argued as employing the use of deadly 
force.  The use of potentially deadly force by the police to end a pursuit was solidified by 
the Supreme Court in Scott v. Harris (2007).  In this case, the Supreme Court relied 
heavily on in-car camera video evidence.  The facts of this case involve Deputy Scott’s 
decision to ram the rear of Mr. Harris vehicle causing it to travel down an embankment.  
This resulted in Mr. Harris, who was 19 years old at the time of the accident, becoming a 
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quadriplegic.  Harris sued claiming Scott’s actions caused his paralysis and violated his 
constitutional rights.  Scott countered by claiming that his actions were warranted due to 
the danger imposed on the public by Mr. Harris’ reckless actions while operating his 
vehicle.  While the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Scott, this decision does not protect 
LEOs from being sued civilly under state statutes for wrongful death (Hess et al., 2014). 
The next section will examine the themes in the literature which impact pursuit-
related collisions and injuries.  Themes identified in the literature and present within the 
data set may be utilized in the statistical analysis.   
 
Administrative Works of Vehicular Pursuits 
 
 To gain a proper perspective on vehicle pursuits, it is necessary to examine some 
of the most well know empirical studies conducted in this area with administrative data.  
These studies are considered seminal works in area of pursuit literature:  the California 
Highway Patrol study of 1982 (Beckman, 1983); Michigan State University study of 1984 
(Payne & Fenske, 1997); the Miami-Metro Dade County Pursuit study (Alpert & 
Dunham, 1990); the Police Pursuit Driving Operations study in Illinois (Auten, 1991); 
and the Illinois State University study (Charles, Falcone & Wells, 1992).  This section 
will examine the overarching themes regarding pursuit-related collisions and injuries 
from these and other studies.  Some of these themes will be utilized as measures for this 
study.   
The methodology and findings from each of these studies are similar in nature.  
They each range from six months to three years in duration.  The frequency of pursuits 
that occurred during the period under observation ranged from 286 to 952 with the 
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majority initiated as the result of a traffic stop.  The following themes were identified in 
the literature:  collision and injury rates, the number or police units involved, the top 
speed of the pursuit, the duration of the pursuit, the distance of the pursuit, the violation 
initiating the pursuit, the time of occurrence and intervention techniques used.  
    
Collision and Injury Rates 
 
Several studies examined the collision and injury rates of pursuits.  The rates of 
collision and injury were relatively consistent between studies.  In the California 
Highway Patrol (CHP) study, Beckman (1983) found collisions to have occurred in thirty 
(30%) percent of the pursuits and injuries occurred eleven (11%) percent of the time 
(Beckman, 1983).  In another study utilizing a modified version on the CHP 
questionnaire, Beckman (1986) found the collision rate to be forty-two (42%) percent 
with a fourteen (14%) percent injury rate.  Three (3%) percent of the injuries were 
fatalities.  Alpert and Dunham (1990) identified an collision rate of thirty-three (33%) 
percent and an injury rate of seventeen (17%) percent in the Miami-Metro Dade County 
Pursuit study of 1986.  Of those injuries, thirty injuries were incurred by the police, 
seventeen injuries by innocent bystanders and one hundred and thirteen injuries were 
incurred by the fleeing suspect or occupants.  Less than one percent (0.7%) were fatalities 
(Alpert & Dunham, 1990).  Auten (1991) established a collision rate of twenty-six (26%) 
percent and an injury rate of nine (9%) percent in the Police Pursuit Driving Operations 
study of 1990 in Illinois.  No fatalities were reported in this study (Auten, 1991).  The 
Illinois State University study found a collision rate of thirty-four (34%) percent and an 
injury rate of seventeen (17%) percent.  Two (2%) percent of the injuries were fatalities 
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(Charles, Falcone & Wells, 1992).  In the Police Pursuits in an Age of Innovation and 
Reform study, Yates (2009) concluded that pursuits ended in collision twenty-three (23%) 
percent of the time.  Nine (9%) percent of these pursuits ended with an injury to the LEO, 
the suspect or an innocent bystander (Yates, 2009).  Alpert and Fridell (1992) found that 
pursuits ended with a collision forty-four (44%) percent of the time in the Minnesota 
study.  They also cited twenty-four (24%) percent of those collisions involved injury.  In 
sum, the reviewed studies found that the about twenty-three (23%) percent to forty-four 
(44%) percent of pursuits ended in collisions. The percent of collisions that resulted in 
injuries varied from nine (9%) percent to twenty-four (24%) percent.  Only point seven 
(0.7%) percent to three (3%) percent of these injuries resulted in a fatality. 
 
Intervention Techniques 
 
The use of pursuit intervention techniques to end a pursuit has the potential for 
negative outcomes.  Some intervention techniques place pursuit vehicles and LEOs in 
proximity to the suspect vehicle and increase the chances for collisions and injuries.  
Yates (2009) found that pursuits were ended by employing tire deflation devices in three-
point four (3.4%) percent of the pursuits (Yates, 2009).  In general, empirical studies that 
examined the circumstances and the risk factors associated with collisions and injuries 
did not consider the role played by various intervention techniques used by LEOs.  
However, intervention techniques such as the use of tire deflation devices and rolling 
blocks may be a point of examination in the study based upon the variance presented in 
the KSP data set.   
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Duration of the Pursuit 
 
The duration of a pursuit may have an impact on the negative outcomes.  Three 
studies examined the duration of pursuits.  Beckman (1983) concluded that pursuits were 
often two minutes or less.  Payne and Fenske (1997) found that most pursuits took place 
over short durations.  In an Analysis of the IACP Report: ‘Police Pursuits in an Age of 
Innovation and Reform, Yates (2009) found the average length of pursuits was five and a 
half minutes in duration.  It can be deduced that pursuits of longer durations may be more 
likely to end in negative outcomes.   
 
Distance of the Pursuit 
   
The distance traveled during a pursuit may have a bearing on negative outcomes.  
There were two studies which addressed the distance of pursuits.  In the Michigan State 
Police study, Payne and Fenske (1997) cited that most pursuits were shorter in distance.  
Similarly, Beckman (1983) found that most pursuits were approximately one mile in 
distance in California Highway Patrol study.  Overall, it is believed that longer pursuits 
have a higher likelihood of ending with negative outcomes (Alpert, 1997).  
 
  
Top Speed of the Pursuit 
  
Pursuits which occurred at higher speeds were believed to have a higher 
likelihood for negative outcomes.  This finding was confirmed in the National Institute of 
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Justice (NIJ) publication, Police pursuit: policies and training (Alpert, 1997); the 
Analysis of the IACP Report: ‘Police Pursuits in an Age of Innovation and Reform 
(Yates, 2009);  Motor vehicle crash deaths related to police pursuits in the United States 
(Rivara and Mack, 2004); and the Emergency Vehicle Operator On-Board Device 
Distractions (Yager, Dinakar, Sanagaram & Ferris, 2015).   
Alpert (1997) specifically stated that the risk of negative outcomes was increased 
when speeds reached over 65 miles per hour (mph).  Abdelwanis (2013) confirmed that 
pursuit speeds of 50 mph and over are significantly associated with collisions.  Similarly, 
Yates (2009) found the high speeds traveled during pursuits were identified as a correlate 
to injury.  It was also determined that the average maximum speed of pursuits was 66 
mph and most involved pursuit speeds exceeding 25 miles per hour over the speed limit 
(Yates, 2009).  Rivara and Mack (2004) found that the characteristics of these collisions 
often included high speeds.  Yager, Dinakar, Sanagaram, and Ferris (2015) suggested that 
the chances for risk of serious collisions is increased by being distracted while operating 
at high speeds while engaged in emergency response or pursuit driving.   
Whether discussing a vehicular pursuit or standard operation of a police vehicle, 
certain factors have the potential to contribute to collisions.  Operation at high rates of 
speed is one of those factors.  LEOs receive driver training and operate a motor vehicle 
far more often than members of the public.  Some consider them to be “professional 
drivers”.  Regardless of this fact, traveling at high speeds affect LEO in much the same 
way as it affects other motorists.  The effect of speed on traffic collisions and fatalities is 
evident in several studies (Friedman, Hedeker, & Richter, 2009; Garber and Gadiraju, 
1992).  The general thesis regarding speed is that higher speed limits lead to higher 
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average speeds which results in higher collision rates and fatalities (Friedman et al., 
2009; Gustafson, 2015).  Simply stated, the greater the speed, the greater the likelihood of 
collisions and injuries.   
 
Number of Police Units Involved 
 
The number of police units involved in a pursuit may have a bearing on the 
potential for safety in pursuit-related collisions.   Two studies address the number of units 
involved in the pursuit.  Those studies are the Police pursuit: policies and training 
(Alpert, 1997) and California Highway Patrol study (Beckman, 1983).   Alpert (1997) 
found the risk of collision and injury was greatly increased when more than one vehicle 
was involved in the pursuit.  Beckman (1983) found that most pursuits involved at least 
two police units.   
 
Violation Initiating the Pursuit 
 
Some suggest a correlation between the violation initiating a pursuit and 
collisions and injuries.  Therefore, it is important to examine which type of violations are 
the most often cited the reason a pursuit was initiated.  Six studies were identified which 
concluded that traffic violations were the most cited reason for initiating a pursuit.  Those 
studies are:  the California Highway Patrol study of 1982 (Beckman, 1983); Michigan 
State University study of 1984 (Payne & Fenske, 1997); Miami-Metro Dade County 
Pursuit study (Alpert & Dunham, 1990); Police Pursuit Driving Operations in Illinois 
(Auten, 1991); Minnesota study (Alpert and Fridell, 1992);  Illinois State University 
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study (Charles, Falcone & Wells, 1992); and the Police Pursuits in an Age of Innovation 
and Reform (Yates, 2009). 
Further, Alpert and Dunham (1990) found that pursuits were initiated as a result 
of an observed traffic violation fifty-four (54%) percent of the time.  Two (2%) percent 
were initiated for driving under the influence or reckless driving.  Alpert and Fridell 
(1992) found traffic violations lead to pursuits in seventy-six (76%) percent of the 
incidents.  Driving under the influence initiated the pursuit in six (6%) percent of these 
incidents.  Yates (2009) found traffic offenses constituted the chief reason pursuits were 
initiated forty-two-point three (42.3%) percent.  The violation of suspicion of driving 
under the influence was cited fourteen-point nine (14.9%) percent of the time.  Seventy-
two-point three (72.3%) percent to KSP pursuits were initiated for traffic violations. The 
measure utilized in this study will narrow traffic violations to include any offense which 
presents a reasonable variance in the KSP data set.  Additionally, driving under the 
influence and reckless driving will be examined as addressed in the literature. 
 
Time of Occurrence 
 
The time of day in which pursuits occur was examined in the literature by several 
scholars.  Several research studies presented the time of day in relation to potential for 
collisions and injuries to occur.  While this time of day was not available in the data set, it 
is important to mention as a potential risk factor in pursuit studies.   Beckman (1983) 
concluded in the California Highway Patrol study most pursuits occurred at night.  Rivara 
and Mack (2004) also found more collision occurring at dark.  In the Michigan State 
University study of 1984, Payne and Fenske (1997) examined the collision rates of 
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Michigan State Police (MSP) pursuits with on-duty MSP troopers and the general 
motoring public under different lighting conditions (i.e., daylight, darkness and 
dawn/dusk).   These results also indicate that collision rates were significantly more 
likely during darkness and less likely to occur during daylight hours.  Further, it was also 
found that more injuries occurred in daylight and darkness but not during dawn or dusk 
light conditions.  Fatalities were not found to be significant during any lighting condition 
other than darkness (Payne & Fenske, 1997).  Yates (2009) established the number of 
pursuits resulting in collisions was higher at dusk twenty-nine (29%) percent than during 
the day twenty-point five (20.5%) percent or at night twenty-five (25%) percent.  
However, the pursuits occurring at dusk only made up a four-point five (4.5%) percent of 
the total (Yates, 2009).   
   
Associated Risks 
 
As common knowledge suggests, there are numerous risks associated with many 
law enforcement activities.  Few of these activities are more dangerous than vehicular 
pursuits.  Therefore, it is important to examine all factors which are more likely to 
increase the risks of collisions.  Overall, risk factors may be difficult to determine 
because there is currently no data system in the USA which examines the characteristics 
of LEO collisions other than Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) which deals 
only with fatalities (Rice, Troszak, & Gustafson, 2015). 
Pursuit-related collisions are inundated with risks to all parties involved, the 
police, the suspect and the community at large.  Overall, pursuits have the potential to 
result in a predictable number of outcomes.  Some of these potential outcomes may 
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include the suspect stopping the vehicle voluntarily and surrendering; the pursued vehicle 
involuntarily colliding with an object and the occupants are injured, killed, apprehended 
or escape; the pursued vehicle involuntarily collides with a pedestrian with or without 
causing injury or death; the pursued vehicle involuntarily collides with another vehicle 
and no injuries occur; the pursued vehicle involuntarily crashes with or without injuries 
to others; or law enforcement may use force to stop the pursued vehicle.  Some uses of 
force may include firearms, stop-sticks, stingers, roadblocks, moving roadblocks, 
ramming, bumping, boxing or the pit-maneuver (Alpert & Anderson, 1986). 
There is little debate about the numerous negative outcomes vehicular pursuits 
present (Morris, 1993).  Typically, there are three characteristics of pursuits which are 
commonly agreed upon regarding pursuits:  1) pursuits are dangerous; 2) pursuits must be 
regulated and; 3) involvement in pursuits increase the adrenaline and emotional state of 
the participants (Hess et al., 2014).  Some place more emphasis on life and property over 
the potential to establish a deterrent effect and believe that pursuits should be restricted 
by law and regulation (Alpert & Fridell, 1992).  A 2015 USA Today article reported that 
139 LEOs were killed in high-speed pursuits from 1979 to 2013.  During that same 
period, 5,000 passengers and bystanders and 6,300 suspects were killed because of high-
speed chases.    Tens of thousands of others sustained personal injury.  There is some 
support for the notion that human and financial costs of pursuits are justified by the need 
to apprehend suspects and the deterrent effect established through enforcement action 
(Hannigan, 1992).  The financial burden of these pursuits has resulted in plaintiffs 
receiving monetary awards in the hundreds of thousands and millions of dollars (Zevitz, 
1987).   
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 In addition to the measurable financial tolls resulting from officer-involved 
vehicle collisions, there are immeasurable emotional tolls placed on families, friends and 
agencies especially when collisions result in the death of a LEO or private citizen.  For 
collisions that do not result in death, those involved suffer long-term health problems, 
such as psychological trauma, long-term disabilities and expensive therapies (Wolfe, 
2015). 
 The Physicians for Automotive Safety (PAS) study was one of the first studies to 
draw attention to the issues surrounding pursuits.  They concluded that one in five 
pursuits ended in death; one in ten pursuits ended in serious injury; and seven of ten 
pursuits ended in a collision (Fennessy, Hamilton, Joscelyn & Merritt, 1970).  Shortly 
after the PAS study, the North Carolina Highway Patrol pursuit study was conducted in 
1968.  The results of this study contradicted the results of the PAS study.  Over a one-
week period, troopers were involved in 44 pursuits and only 5 ended with a collision.  
The collision ratio was 9:1 and the personal injury ratio was 22:1 (Fennessy, Hamilton, 
Joscelyn, & Merrit, 1970; Fennessy & Joscelyn, 1971).  Following the Fennessy report, 
the California Highway Patrol (CHP) conducted a study in 1983.  As discussed earlier in 
this study, they found that three in ten pursuits ended in a collision, one (1%) percent 
ended in a fatality and eleven (11%) percent resulted in personal injury.  Each of these 
studies ended with similar findings.  Pursuits have the potential to end with a collision 
resulting in personal injury or death.  
The article Characteristics of Law Enforcement Officer’s Fatalities in Motor 
Vehicle Crashes, was published by NHTSA (2010).  It explored demographic and 
situational factors involved in LEO traffic collisions.  This study examined the 
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characteristics of collisions occurring between the years 1980 and 2008.  NHTSA found 
that the LEO and non-LEO groups showed substantially different characteristics at most 
points of examination (2010).  However, LEOs typically have more discretion in terms of 
speeds traveled during pursuits than other emergency vehicles (FEMA, 2014).     
 In a similar study conducted in Metro-Dade, Alpert and Dunham (1989) found the 
location of the pursuit to be a significant predictor of collisions and injuries.  
Additionally, road conditions were found to be a significant predictor of collision and 
apprehension.  It was also concluded that serious injury to either the police or bystanders 
was rare (Alpert & Dunham, 1989).  
 Alpert and Dunham’s (1990) study provided some useful context for 
administrators within policing.  In this study, they examined the effect of the officer’s age 
on the pursuit outcome.  The study examined several negative outcomes and found that 
the age of the involved LEOs was the first of seven predictors of collisions.  It was 
determined that pursuits involving LEOs in their twenties (N = 56) and thirties (N = 42) 
were more likely to result in a collision than LEOs in their forties (N = 9).   Conversely, 
LEOs in their twenties (N = 41) and thirties (N = 24) were less likely to sustain personal 
injury resulting from the pursuit than LEOs in their forties (N = 7).   Overall and 
conclusively, negative outcomes were higher for LEOs in their twenties (N = 83 or 53%) 
and thirties (N = 59 or 49%) than for older LEOs (N = 7 or 44%).  Additionally, Alpert 
and Dunham’s (1990) found that older LEOs were more likely to engage in pursuits of 
longer duration, higher speeds, disregard traffic signals and pursue on freeways.  
However, older LEOs were less likely to engage in pursuits at night. 
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 Similarly, Lockie, Dawes, Kornhauser, Holmes, & Orr (2018) conducted a study 
to compare the driving characteristics of younger officers and older officers.  This 
evaluation was conducted on a police pursuit driving course (i.e., Driving Program 
Practical Test (DPPT)) with a sample of 43 incumbent LEOs grouped into two different 
age groups (i.e., 20–39 and 40–59 years of age).  All participates were instructed to 
complete the driving course as quickly as possible while disturbing the least number of 
markers possible.  A one-way ANOVA was utilized to analyze the results.  They found 
that the 20-39 year group completed the course more quickly but committed more 
infractions.  The 40–59 year group completed the course more slowly but exhibited fewer 
infractions.    
In a comparable study conducted by Rice et al. (2015), found a strong negative 
association between age and the culpability of a LEO involved in a non-pursuit-related 
collision.  Younger LEOs as compared to LEOs over 50 years of age have higher 
probabilities of being found culpable in the collisions.  From a policy standpoint, it may 
be useful to monitor and closely supervise the vehicular operations of younger LEOs 
more closely.  The early identification of LEOs who lack proficient skill in vehicle 
operation is also important.  Additional driver training, pursuit training and risk 
inoculation for younger LEOs could lead to reduced collision involvement. 
 When assessing the costs and benefits of engaging in pursuits, some argue that 
arrests stemming from pursuits may lead to marginal results under the deterrence and 
incapacitation theory (Chamlin, 1988; Greenberg & Kessler, 1982; Greenberg, Kessler, & 
Logan, 1979).  However, others state that there is no data available which directly leads 
 24 
 
to a crime reduction or deterrent effect resulting from any arrests made after the pursuit 
(Crew & Hart, 1999).   
An empirical analysis was conducted by Crew, Kessler, & Fridell, (1995) which 
examined the costs and benefits involved in pursuits.  They found that the costs and 
benefits tended to vary in relation to the events that initiated the pursuit.  This study 
supported the notion that costs of pursuing were relatively high in relation to any 
potential benefits gained from engaging in the pursuit for a specific violation. 
Crew and Hart (1999) conducted a study in Minnesota to assess the value gained 
from engaging in vehicular pursuits and built upon the earlier works of Crew et al. 
(1995).  To operationalize this study, they had to attach a monetary value to any arrest 
made at the end of a pursuit.  This was done by assigning the value that “one pays for a 
crime” as the average monetary cost of a crime.  They operationalize the cost of a pursuit 
in two ways:  1) the average amount paid in claim costs for bodily injury and property 
damage as reported by the American Insurance Industry (Insurance Information Institute, 
1997); and 2) the average financial value of a fatality as assessed by Miller (1990).  This 
logic was consistent with the methodology utilized in civil law damage suits by which the 
guilty party is assessed a monetary award for any damages, injuries and deaths resulting 
from their actions (Crew & Hart, 1999).  At the time this study was conducted, the 
estimated damages sustained in Minnesota was $185 million worth of accidents, injuries 
and deaths which were a result of pursuits. The total value, however, of the benefits to 
Minnesota were found to outweigh the costs 60-fold to the amount of $11 billion.  Crew 
and Hart (1999) also found that pursuits were nearly 30 percent more likely to end in a 
negative outcome.  Further, certain types of pursuits were more likely to result in a 
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negative outcome which was dependent upon the incident that precipitated the pursuit 
(Crew and Hart, 1999). 
 Vila (2000, 2006) identified the officer’s level of fatigue as a contributing factor 
in LEO collisions.  The author stated that LEO’s fatigue may lead to errors in judgement 
which may result in collisions.  Some argue that driving while fatigued is like driving 
while intoxicated (Williamson, Feyer, Mattick, Friswell, & Finlay-Brown, 2001).  A 
person who has been awake for 20 hours possesses a similar diminished capacity to 
operate a motor vehicle as someone who is legally drunk with a blood-alcohol content of 
0.08 (Dawson & Reid, 1997).  It is commonly accepted that fatigue may result in 
dangerous situations in many aspects.  Yet no standard exists to regulate LEOs from 
being overly fatigued while working.  Vila (2000, 2006, and 2009) argues further that the 
shift work experienced by LEOs may have a lasting and compounding effect on work 
output and levels of fatigue.  Many LEOs may not be adequately rested and prepared to 
make sound judgements on the job (Vila & Gustafson, 2011, p. 12). 
 James and Vila (2012) also studied LEOs involved in collisions as they relate to 
distraction.  Prior to the many technological innovations of recent times, patrol vehicles 
were just that, patrol vehicles.  LEOs were used to drive in and around a designated area 
at slow speeds while on patrol.  Today, a great many items create unintended distraction 
for the LEO.  Some of these things include mobile data terminals, video cameras, in-car 
radios and cellular phones.  Bener, Lajunen, Özkan, and Haigney, (2006) specifically 
researched cellular telephone usage in the general population and determined that the 
distraction created resulted in statistically significant increases in collision rates.  Some 
states began to enact “hands free” laws to counteract this commonly accepted belief.  
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Abdel-Aty (2003) found that drivers were distracted when using a cellular phone–hands 
free or otherwise.  This finding was also substantiated by McCartt, Hellinga, & Bratiman 
(2006) who conducted a meta-analysis of 125 studies. 
Today, for the LEO, mastering the art of being able to rapidly divert attention to 
multiple tasks is paramount and, in some cases, can be the difference between life and 
death.  Some believe that human beings can only focus attention on one thing at a time 
and that multitasking is a myth.  Some people may become very adept at switching from 
one task to another and then refocusing, but this is not multitasking or focusing on 
multiple tasks at the same time (James & Vila, 2012; Loukopoulos, Dismukes, & Barshi, 
2009; Rosen, 2008).  When LEOs are confronted with multiple tasks requiring immediate 
attention during situations such as a pursuit, the LEOs mind must shift focus from one 
thing to another continually in rapid succession.  This pattern of shifting focus diminishes 
cognitive resources throughout the incident and over time during work shift.  This occurs 
regardless of whether the LEO does so actively and consciously.  The mere presence and 
persistence of these multiple tasks can adversely affect work performance over time 
(James & Vila, 2012). 
Many academics view LEO collisions and fatalities as being caused by a lack of 
command-and-control management or agency policy (Batiste, Wagers, & Ashton, 2011; 
Gustafson, 2009; IACP, 2011; Schultz, Hudak, & Alpert 2009).  The common theme 
among those that have studied this aspect is that law enforcement administrators should 
set expectations in policy and in practice which hold LEOs accountable for driving 
responsibly.  With speed and failure to wear seatbelts being a factor in approximately half 
of the fatalities and traffic collisions, it can be argued that some of these accidents are 
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preventable.  Schulz et al., (2009) conducted research on traffic collisions and fatalities 
resulting from pursuits.  They found that permissive pursuit policies were linked to higher 
collision rates and fatalities.   
Some have linked aggressive driving and risk-taking behaviors as correlates to 
collision involvement (Castro, 2008; Dorn, 2005, 2010).  These authors suggest that 
individual factors (i.e., personality/behavioral/cognitive) can contribute to a higher 
likelihood of collisions.  Training, screening, and pursuit monitoring have been suggested 
as remedies (Castro, 2008; Dorn and Barker, 2005; Dorn, 2010).   
LaTourrette (2015) conducted a study which examined the environmental, vehicle 
or individual-level characteristics associated with LEO collisions and of these 
characteristics, which possesses the greatest risk collision-related injury.  A cross-
sectional survey was distributed to a national sample of law enforcement agencies to 
collect information about LEO collisions.  This national sample was separated into 12 
groups composed of a municipal, county, and state police agencies.  These agencies were 
then separated into four geographic regions as defined by the US Census Bureau.    The 
survey instrument contained questions about collision causal factors, vehicle information 
and operator information.  This study did not examine different driving conditions or 
driver characteristics.  LaTourrette (2015) found that 80 percent of non-minor crashes 
occurred without lights or sirens activated.  However, LEOs had three to four times a 
greater risk of injury with lights or sirens activated.  LEOs were twice as likely to sustain 
an injury with lights only activated.  Seventy percent of the injuries occurred during 
routine, non-emergency driving situations.  Some risk factors for collisions with more 
substantial injuries include failure to wear seatbelts, vehicle type (i.e., motorcycle riders).  
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Risk of injury was twice as probable in collisions occurring during the day as compared 
to the night.  Lastly, LaTourrette (2015) found a marginally significant relationship 
between pursuit training and collisions with lights and sirens activated.  Remarkably, 
LaTourrette (2015) did not find significantly elevated risk of injury in operator 
distractions, operator age and work experience, and operator amounts of sleep and 
operator work history. 
Once the decision is made that a pursuit must be terminated because the danger 
presented is too great, an intervention technique must be selected and employed to end 
the pursuit.  Most intervention strategies also pose a risk of collision.  Various pursuit 
intervention techniques present considerably less risk than others.  Some of these 
techniques include the use of tire deflation devices to safely stop the suspect vehicle, 
aerial surveillance to safely track the suspect vehicle, and GPS tracker technology used to 
observe the suspect vehicle until it voluntarily stops.  Other pursuit intervention 
techniques which are somewhat less safe involve the use of the patrol vehicle to “box in” 
or “channel” the suspect vehicle to a safer location suitable for apprehension.  The 
riskiest techniques involve vehicle to vehicle contact through what is called legal 
intervention.  A more comprehensive discussion of these risk management strategies is 
presented within policy recommendations because it is unclear what are the trends and 
correlates of collisions and injuries in the Kentucky State Police.   
Pursuits, typically, involve the police, the suspect and often innocent by-standers 
in the public (Dunham, 1998).  Police are constrained by agency policy, training and 
supervision.  Conversely, suspects are not constrained by any factors making it nearly 
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impossible to regulate their behavior without their voluntary compliance (Dunham, 
1998).   
LEOs spend much of their time operating a motor vehicle.  The time they spend in 
a vehicle is, substantially, more than the time an average citizen spends driving.  
Additionally, LEOs engage in many activities that may be considered violations of the 
law by private citizens such as pursuit driving, high speed emergency response driving 
and violation of roadway laws (Wolfe et al., 2015).  Even so, pursuits remain one of the 
most dangerous activities LEOs engage in on the job.    Over the last two decades, the 
leading cause of death for LEOs is traffic collisions (FBI, 2008B; National Law 
Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund, 2014; NLEOMF, 2009; President Obama’s Task 
Force on 21st Century Policing, 2015).  It has been so prevalent that the federal 
government (FBI, 2008b; NHTSA, 2010b) has identified it as a primary occupational 
hazard for LEOs (NIOSH, 2009).   
 One of the goals law enforcement agencies have in the interest of mitigating risk 
is to remove split-second decisions from the LEO involved in the pursuit who is under 
extreme amounts of stress and adrenaline (Alpert, 1998).  This may be accomplished by 
supervisory staff monitoring the pursuit over the mobile radio as the pursuing LEO relays 
moment by moment accounts to radio dispatch.  This allows for a neutral and detached 
supervisor to make real-time decisions about the pursuit based upon the reason for the 
pursuit, the location, speed and any number of risk factors present at the time.  LEOs 
engaged in pursuits also evaluate the same factors.  Then individually or collectively 
LEOs and supervision decide to continue the pursuit or terminate the pursuit pending 
further action.    
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If it is decided that a pursuit should or must be terminated, many LEOs cite the 
following reasons for terminating a pursuit:  traffic conditions, certain speed zones and 
dangerous conditions (Falcone, 1994).  Britz and Payne (1994) showed there was a 
difference in attitude relating to pursuits between line level LEOs and administrators.  In 
this study, LEOs reported serious deficiencies in written pursuit policy and issues with 
pursuit training.  Thirty-eight (38%) percent of respondents viewed their agency’s pursuit 
policy difficult to comprehend and implement.  Homant and Kennedy (1994) reviewed a 
study to assess risk and pursuit tendencies among line LEOs from departments with 
different policies.   As expected, they found that LEOs with permissive policies were 
more inclined to engage in pursuits while LEOs with more restrictive policies pursued 
less often (Homant & Kennedy, 1994).  Alpert and Madden (1994) focused on police 
supervisors, recruits and criminal justice students.  They estimated the impact of four 
critical factors on a LEO’s decision to pursue a suspect.  These four factors included 1) 
type of offense committed; 2) location of the pursuit; 3) perceived need to apprehend the 
suspect and 4) traffic and weather conditions.  Supervisors reported the perceived need to 
apprehend was more important than the risk posed to the LEO and department.  They also 
found that the enforcement of certain laws received priority over the safety of the public.  
Students however, reported the perceived risk factors as more important than the 
perceived need to apprehend.  Overall, Alpert and Madden (1994) found that the most 
important factor influencing a LEO’s decision to pursue a suspect among all groups of 
respondents was the need to apprehend the suspect.  Traffic conditions were determined 
to be second most important factor followed by the location of the pursuit and weather 
conditions which ranked last. 
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Another study conducted by Alpert (1998) utilized the same three levels of 
respondents (i.e., students, police recruits and police supervisors) as Alpert and Madden 
(1994) to examine factors influencing the decision to pursue including location.  This 
study showed that in some cases, the LEOs’ attitudes conflicted with agency policy.   
LEOs and supervisors responded that the “area of pursuit” had no significant effect on 
engaging in a vehicular pursuit whether in a commercial area or on a freeway.  Pursuits, 
however, were less likely to occur in inner-cities or residential environments.  LEOs and 
supervisors both reported that the most important factor in the decision to pursue was the 
need to apprehend.  Traffic conditions were determined to be the most important risk 
factors. 
As discussed, there are numerous negative outcomes associated with vehicular 
pursuits.  The findings from numerous studies have been presented.  Understandably, law 
enforcement agencies have an obligation to thoroughly investigate pursuits and employ 
effective risk management strategies as a means of mitigating negative outcomes.  For a 
risk to be mitigated, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of factors contributing 
to the risk associated with collisions and injuries.   
To reduce risk and improve safety for those involved in pursuits as well as all 
others, it is important to have a perspective on the leading contributing factors of these 
collisions and injuries.  This type of information relating to these causes may be more 
accurate and easily obtained from the LEOs involved in these collisions due to the 
thorough investigations, which typically occur after any collision involving a police 
cruiser.  The focus of this study will be centered on this type of data as addressed in the 
literature and collected in the KSP data set. 
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Research Questions 
  
This study will utilize two research questions.  The first research question pertains 
to the trend analysis.  The first research question is: what are the trends in collisions and 
injuries within Kentucky State Police vehicular pursuit practices?  The second research 
question is: what are the correlates of collisions and injuries within Kentucky State Police 
vehicular pursuit practices? 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
  
This study examines the relationship between pursuit-related collisions and 
injuries over time through a trend analysis.  Collisions and injuries were also examined in 
relation to numerous potential contributing factors contained within the data set.   
The data used for this study was obtained from the Strategic Planning Branch 
(SPB) of the KSP.   The SPB obtained and compiled this pursuit data by reviewing state 
police Teletype reports which, per policy, are created for each pursuit.  Each pursuit 
Teletype report (pursuit Teletype) is completed in the Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) 
system by KSP dispatchers working at each respective post.  Pursuit Teletypes are 
required to be completed after every pursuit involving KSP personnel.  The CAD 
Teletype template contains the following fields to ensure standardization of the data 
collected:  1) when did the pursuit occur?; 2) which post area did the pursuit occur in?; 3) 
which agency initiated the pursuit?; 4) how many police units were involved in the 
pursuit?; 5) was the suspect apprehended after the pursuit?; 6) did the suspect resist arrest 
after the pursuit?; 7) did the suspect flee after being stopped by the police?; 8) did a 
fatality occur as a result of the pursuit?; 9) did the suspect flee on foot once stopped?; 10) 
was a tire deflation technique used to stop the suspect?; 11) was a legal intervention 
technique used to stop the suspect?;  12) was the rolling road block technique used to stop 
the suspect; 13) did any injuries occur as a result of the collision; 14) did a collision occur 
as a result of the pursuit?; 15) what was the distance the pursuit traveled?; 16) what was 
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the duration of the pursuit?; 17) what was the top speed of the pursuit?; 18) what was the 
vehicle type driven by the suspect pursued?; 19) was the pursuit terminated by law 
enforcement?;  20) if terminated, why was the pursuit terminated by law enforcement?; 
21) was the pursued suspect a juvenile?; 22) what was the violation for which the pursuit 
was initiated? 
Then periodically, the SPB consolidates the pursuit data collected on the 
Teletypes in to an excel spreadsheet for each respective calendar year.  The author 
obtained these spreadsheets and combined them into one spreadsheet containing calendar 
years 2009 through 2017.  Once reformatted, recoded and checked for errors, this 
spreadsheet was imported into SPSS 22 and Stata 15 to create and analyze the data set in 
this study.  The author also created a codebook to accompany this data set. 
   
Measures 
 
 Based upon the literature, several measures were identified and will be used in 
this study.  The dependent measures are pursuit-related collisions and injuries.  In 
research, the dependent variable (Y) is impacted by the independent variable(s) (X) to 
produce an effect (Vito & Blankenship, 2002).   The pursuit-related collisions and 
injuries dichotomous variables will be used as the dependent variables.  They were coded 
(No Collision = 0, Collision = 1) and (No Injury = 0, Injury = 1) respectively. 
In research, independent variables produce an effect or impact the dependent 
variable (Vito & Blankenship, 2002).  Other measures included in the dataset will be 
examined as correlates to pursuit-related collisions and injuries depending on their 
variance in the data.  Rice, Troszak and Gustafson (2015) note inexperienced drivers (i.e., 
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juveniles) as a risk factor in collisions.  However, only 2% of the suspects were minors. 
Similarly, although there are 47 violations which resulted in pursuits being initiated by 
the KSP, only those that are more frequent will be considered here.  As noted in the 
literature, traffic violations were the most often cited reason for initiating pursuits.  Of 
those violations, the following violations were more common and will be used as 
independent measures (Speeding 31%; Reckless Driving 12%; Avoiding/Fleeing Traffic 
Checkpoints 5%; No/Expired Registration Plates 5%; and Driving under the Influence 
4%).  Individual characteristics of the officer and suspect and environmental 
characteristics were not available within the data therefore were not utilized in this study.   
Independent measures selected for analysis are 1) Number of Units Involved; 2) 
Tire Deflation Used; 3) Rolling Road Block Used; 4) Distance of the Pursuit; 5) Duration 
of the Pursuit; 6) Top Speed of the Pursuit; 7) Juvenile Suspect; 8 - 12) Violation Causing 
the Pursuit.  They were coded as follows:  1) Number of Units Involved (1–2 Units = 0; 3 
or more Units = 1); 2) Tire Deflation Used (No Tire Deflation Used = 0, Tire Deflation 
Used = 1); 3) Rolling Road Block (No Rolling Road Block Used = 0; Rolling Road 
Block Used = 1);  4) Distance of the Pursuit (5 Mile or less = 0; 6 Miles or farther = 1) 5) 
Duration of the Pursuit (5 Minutes or fewer = 0; 6 Minutes or longer = 1); 6) Top Speed 
of the Pursuit (65 MPH or Less = 0; 66 MPH or More = 1); 7) Juvenile suspect (Adult = 
0; Juvenile = 1); 8 - 12) Violation Causing the Pursuit (Other = 0; Speeding = 1);  (Other 
= 0; Reckless Driving = 1);  (Other = 0; No/Expired Registration Plates = 1);  (Other = 0; 
Avoiding/Fleeing Traffic Checkpoint = 1);  and (Other = 0; Driving under the Influence = 
1) .   
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Analysis Plan 
  
Overall, three major steps will be taken to provide information that will address 
the research questions.  The first step is a presentation of the descriptive statistics that 
will provide clear information about the distribution of the data.   Descriptive statistics 
are a way of summarizing the data by presenting information such as the count or how 
the data is distributed (Vito & Blankenship, 2002).   The descriptive statistics that will be 
used in this study include the following:  mean, standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum.     
 The second major step in the analysis is the trend analysis.  To be clear, the trend 
analysis will address the following research question:  what are the trends in collisions 
and injuries in the Kentucky State Police vehicular pursuit practices?  To address this 
research question, the trend analysis will be performed following the guidelines from the 
Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).  The CDC advocates a multi-step 
process for examining trends.   
 The first step (Step 1) of the trend analysis is a series of regression analyses.  
Given the dependent measure for this study is dichotomous, the regression of choice is 
logistic regression.  In other words, three logistic regression analyses will be performed 
to determine the shape of the trends of collisions.  Each logistic regression will include an 
orthogonal polynomial version of year.  This is done to determine whether the change in 
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collisions is linear, quadratic, or cubic per the CDC guidelines.  The highest polynomial 
that is statistically significant will be used for further analysis.1   
 The second step (Step 2) of the trend analysis, if the change in collisions is 
quadratic or cubic, is to determine in what years the greatest and statistically significant 
changes occur.  To perform this analysis, the margins from the logistic regression that 
contains the largest polynomial will be entered in the National Cancer Institute’s 
Joinpoint program.  The Joinpoint program uses the Bayesian analysis to determine the 
proper location of where the largest change took place resulting in a number of segments.  
If the analysis is examining a quadratic change, two segments would be found.  If the 
analysis is examining a cubic change, three segments would be found.   
 The third step (Step 3) of the trend analysis is an analysis of whether the segments 
from a quadratic or cubic analysis are linear and the average percent change for each 
segment.  This will require more logistic regression analyses.  Each logistic regression 
would include a linear polynomial.  If the linear polynomial is significant, then the 
segment is viewed as linear.  In addition, for each segment, an additional logistic 
regression will be executed that will provide information about the average percent 
change for each segment.   
 These three steps will provide valuable information to address the first research 
question.  Results of this type do not appear in the research literature nor do they appear 
                                                          
1As a side note, a linear polynomial is smallest polynomial tested in this analysis.  A quadratic polynomial 
is larger than a linear polynomial, but it is smaller than a cubic polynomial.  Further, the cubic polynomial 
is considered the largest of all three polynomials that are being examined.   
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in any report by the Kentucky State Police.  The trend analysis, thus, may provide unique 
information in the context of pursuit collisions.   
 The third major step in the analysis is an examination of the correlates to a 
collision using logistic regression analysis.  Specifically, after the trend analysis, the 
second research question will be addressed.  The second research question is: what are 
the correlates of a collision in the Kentucky State Police vehicular pursuit practices?  As 
with the trend analysis, logistic regression analysis was used because the dependent 
measure was dichotomous (Pallant, 2013).   
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
 
 
STEP 1 – Descriptive Statistics 
  
The KSP Pursuit dataset created for this study contained a population size of 
(N=1200) pursuits.  This entire population (i.e., 2009-2017) was used in this study.  
Regarding the dependent variables, there were a total of (31%, N=355) collisions and 
(18%, N=170) injuries occurring during this period (TABLE 1).  Regarding injuries, only 
(1%, N=9) of the pursuit resulted in fatality of the suspect.  The majority of the injuries 
were to the suspect (9%, N=94) with (6%, N=63) to the officer, (0.3%, N=3) to the public 
and (0.2%, N=2) to the passenger.  
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Measure Mean  SD  Minimum Maximum Sum 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Dependent Variable 
Collisions  0.31  ------  0  1  355 
Injuries 0.18  ------  0  1  170  
Independent Variables 
Post Location   7.22  5.013  1  16  8637 
Month    6.47  3.367  1  12  7,759  
Units    2.42  2.582  1  20  2,902  
Units    0.27  ------  0  1  320  
Tire Deflation   0.13  ------  0  1  154  
Rolling Road   0.04  ------  0  1  16  
Distance 10.68  12.404  0  105  12,239  
Distance   0.52  ------  0  1  594 
Duration 10.15  11.294  1  140  10119 
Duration   0.56  ------  0  1  556 
Topspeed 85.76             27.215  0  175  101,366  
Topspeed   0.74  ------  0  1  879  
Juvenile   0.02  ------  0  1  20 
Speeding   0.31  ------  0  1  367 
Reckless   0.12  ------  0  1  144     
Checkpoint    0.05  ------  0  1  64 
 Reg. Plates    0.06  ------  0  1  70 
 DUI       0.04  ------  0  1  51  
_____________________________________________________________________         
 
Numerous independent variables were examined in this study.  Most of the 
pursuits, collisions and injuries occurred during the month of April and during the year 
2017.  Pursuits occurred throughout Kentucky with most of the pursuits taking place in 
the Post 11 London (N=125) area.  The fewest pursuits occurred in the Post 7 Richmond 
Area (N=36).  Most pursuits only involved one LEO which was consistent with the 
literature (Alpert, 1997).  There was a total of 2,606 LEOs involved in all the pursuits for 
a mean of 2.42 units per pursuit.  Twenty-six-point seven (26.7%) percent of pursuits 
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involved three or more units.  Tire deflation devices were used during 154 of the pursuits 
while rolling roadblocks were used only 16 times.  Most often, pursuits were 2 miles in 
distance while the average distance was 10.68 miles overall.  Most pursuits were 6 miles 
or farther covering a total of 12,239 miles overall.  Most pursuits were 2 minutes in 
duration while the mean duration was 10.15 minutes long.  The majority of pursuits were 
6 minutes or longer and the time covered for all pursuit encompassed 10,119 minutes or 
168 hours and 39 minutes.  The distance and duration are also consistent with the 
literature which found most pursuits to be shorter in distance (Yates, 2009) and shorter 
duration (Beckman, 1983; Payne and Fenske, 1997).  The top speed was 66 miles per 
hour or more approximately 74% of the time.  A juvenile suspect was only involved in 20 
of the 1,200 pursuits.  As indicated in the literature and confirmed in the KSP pursuit data 
(72.3%), the most common violation for which a pursuit was initiated was a traffic 
violation (Alpert & Dunham, 1990; Alpert and Fridell, 1992; Auten, 1991; Beckman, 
1983; Charles, Falcone & Wells, 1992; Payne & Fenske, 1997).  Of these traffic 
violations, speeding (31%, N=367), reckless driving (12%, N=144), fleeing a traffic 
safety checkpoint (5%, N=64), no/expired registration plates (6%, N=70) and driving 
under the influence (4%, N=51) were the most prevalent violations (TABLE 1).   
Other statistics of interest regarding KSP pursuits are as follows.  A total of 900 
suspects (75% of the 1,200) pursued were apprehended.  Pursuits were infrequently 
subject to termination (20%, N=243).  The leading two reasons pursuits were terminated 
were: when the officer lost sight of the suspect (9%, N=114) and when the pursuit entered 
a restricted zone/area (2%, N=32).   Logistic regression will be the primary means of 
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analysis which does not require a normal distribution of data.  Therefore, it is 
unnecessary to report skewness and kurtosis.   
STEP 2 – Trend Analysis 
 
Trend analysis was utilized to answer the first research question which is “What 
are the trends in collisions and injuries in the Kentucky State Police vehicular pursuit 
practices?”  A series of three logistic regressions were run for each dependent variable.  
Three variations (i.e., linear, quadratic and cubic) of the time frame year were utilized in 
step one of the trend analysis process.  It was determined that only the linear models were 
found to be significant for both the dependent variables (i.e., collisions and injuries).  
This was somewhat surprising regarding injuries because there was a spike in 2014 
(N=36) followed by a sharp decrease in 2015 (N=21) which could have resulted in a 
quadratic trend, but the data did not show this occurring.  Because the quadratic (p=.16 
and p=.41) and cubic (p=.69 and p=.68) logistic regression models were not found to be 
significant, Steps 2 and 3 of the trend analysis were unnecessary and Joinpoint software 
was not utilized to determine the critical values.  However, the linear trends may be 
interpreted for both dependent variables. 
Across all years (i.e., 2009 – 2017), 31% percent of pursuits ended in a collision 
and 18% of pursuits ended in injury.  As illustrated in TABLE 2 and TABLE 3, the 
analysis concluded with evidence of increasing trends in collisions (b=0.17) and injuries 
(b=0.18) across time.  Collisions occurred at a rate of 22% in 2009.  This rate gradually 
increased to an all-time high of 32% in 2017.  Similarly, the injuries rate in 2009 was 
13%.  The injury rate increased steadily to 20% in 2017.   
 43 
 
TABLE 2 
Trends in Pursuit-related Collisions 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Year   Prevalence  Polynomials  Beta  P-value 
All Years  0.31   Linear    0.17  0.05 
2009   0.22    
2010   0.23   Linear   -5.41  0.16 
2011   0.24   Quadratic   2.21  0.16 
2012   0.25 
2013   0.27   Linear   -5.41  0.16 
2014   0.28   Quadratic   2.21  0.16 
2015   0.29   Cubic    0.00  0.69 
2016   0.30 
2017   0.32 
_____________________________________________________________________     
     
TABLE 3 
Trends in Pursuit-related Injuries 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Year   Prevalence  Polynomials  Beta  P-value 
All Years  0.18   Linear   0.18  0.05 
2009   0.13 
2010   0.14   Linear   -4.30  0.43 
2011   0.14   Quadratic   1.77  0.41 
2012   0.15 
2013   0.16   Linear   ------ ------ 
2014   0.17   Quadratic  ------ ------ 
2015   0.18   Cubic    0.00  0.68 
2016   0.19 
2017   0.20 
_____________________________________________________________________         
  
Overall, the number of pursuit-related collisions and pursuit-related injuries has 
increased from 2009 to 2017 for the KSP (FIGURE 1).  
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Figure 1.  KSP Trends in Pursuit-related Collisions and Injuries.  This figure illustrates 
the trends in KSP pursuit-related collisions and injuries between 2009 and 2017. 
 
STEP 3 – Logistic Regressions 
 
 Logistic regression was utilized to address research question number two, “What 
are the correlates of collisions and injuries in the Kentucky State Police?”  Two logistic 
regressions were utilized to determine if any of the independent variables identified in the 
literature can provide some predictive value in the dependent variables.  The independent 
variables utilized in these logistic regressions were 1) Year; 2) Number of Units 
Involved; 3) Tire Deflation Used; 4) Rolling Road Block Used; 5) Distance of the 
Pursuit; 6) Duration of the Pursuit; 7) Top Speed of the Pursuit; 8) Juvenile Suspect; 9 - 
13) Violation Causing the Pursuit (i.e., Speeding, Reckless Driving, No/Expired 
Registration Plates, Avoiding/Fleeing Traffic Checkpoint, Driving Under the Influence).  
Logistic regression was chosen as the method of evaluation because the dependent 
variables were dichotomous.  A logistic regression was also conducted between the two 
dependent variables which indicated statistical significance at p=0.000. 
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 Two models were developed, one for collisions (Model 1) and one for injuries 
(Model 2).  Each model was tested for collinearity and contain thirteen independent 
measures.  For Model 1 (TABLE 4), two of the independent variables were found to be 
statistically significant and provided predictive value in determining collisions.  Those 
variables were “Tire Deflation Used” (p=0.024; S.E.=0.144; Odd Ratio=0.436) and 
“Number of Units Involved” (p=0.033; S.E.=0.057; Odd Ratio=1.126).  This indicates 
that whenever a tire deflation device was used, the potential for collisions decreased by 
fifty-six point four (56.4%) percent.  Conversely, whenever three or more units were 
involved in a pursuit, the pursuit was 1.126 times more likely to end in a collision.  
TABLE 4 
Model 1 – Logistic Regression – Pursuit-Related Collisions 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Measure    Odds Ratio   S.E.   t p  95% C.I. Odds Ratio 
         Lower            Upper 
Independent 
Variables 
Year    1.170    0.198   0.93 0.368  0.816  1.676     
Units    1.126    0.057  2.33 0.033*  1.010  1.254 
Tire Deflation  0.436  0.144            -2.50 0.024*  0.216  0.881 
Rolling Road   2.189  1.701  1.01 0.328  0.421           11.369 
Distance   0.611  0.292            -1.03 0.319  0.222  1.684  
Duration   1.784  0.880  1.17 0.258  0.626  5.079  
Topspeed   0.885  0.252            -0.43 0.676  0.484  1.620 
Juvenile   1.832  1.278  1.87 0.398  0.417             8.044  
Speeding   0.937  0.296            -0.20 0.841  0.479  1.833 
Reckless   0.488  0.171            -2.05 0.058  0.232  2.026 
Checkpoint    0.251  0.271            -1.28 0.220  0.025  2.493 
 Reg. Plates        1.499  0.873  0.69 0.497  0.435  5.156 
 DUI    0.731  0.352            -0.65 0.526  0.263  2.031 
 _____________________________________________________________________         
*p < 0.05 
 For Model 2 (TABLE 5), none of the independent variables provided any 
predictive value in determining injuries.   
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TABLE 5 
Model 2 – Logistic Regression - Pursuit-Related Injuries 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Measure    Odds Ratio   S.E.   t p  95% C.I. Odds Ratio 
         Lower            Upper 
Independent 
Variables 
Year    1.068    0.168   0.42 0.680  0.764  1.494     
Units     1.043    0.060  0.74 0.471  0.922  1.180 
Tire Deflation   0.788  0.400            -0.47 0.646  0.268  2.314 
Rolling Road   1.604  1.350  0.56 0.582  0.269  9.554 
Distance   0.590  0.279            -1.11 0.282  0.217  1.608  
Duration    1.566  0.479  1.47 0.162  0.819  2.996  
Topspeed    1.473  0.820  0.70 0.497  0.452  4.799 
Juvenile   3.791  3.371  1.62 0.124  0.656           24.021  
Speeding      1.054  0.311  0.18 0.859  0.563  1.974 
Reckless    0.459  0.340            -1.05 0.310  0.095  2.214 
Checkpoint    1.042  0.691  0.06 0.951  0.255  4.253 
 Reg. Plates    1.441  0.573  0.92 0.372  0.620  3.342 
 DUI     1.383  0.708  0.63 0.535  0.467  4.096 
 _____________________________________________________________________         
*p < 0.05 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
  
This study sought to examine the trends involving KSP pursuit-related collisions 
and injuries over a span of years (STEP 2).  It also sought to determine if some of the 
contributing factors (i.e., measures) identified in the literature can serve as predictors to 
collision and injuries (STEP 3).   
Trends 
Regarding the trend analysis utilized to answer the first research question, it was 
determined that there is an increasing linear trend present with pursuit-related collisions 
and injuries for this time frame.  The rates of collision trended upward from 2009 through 
2017.  Similarly, the trends for injuries also increased.  This was reasonable based upon 
the significant (p<0.001) relationship between collisions and injuries.   
Predictors 
The secondary research question was addressed with logistic regressions.  As the 
literature suggests, there are certain factors which may increase the likelihood of negative 
outcomes.  These measures include having three or more police units participating in the 
pursuit, deploying a tire deflation device against the suspect vehicle, using a rolling road 
block involving multiple units to slow or stop the suspect vehicle, engaging in pursuits 
that extend farther than 5 miles, engaging in pursuits that last longer than 5 minutes, 
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participating in pursuits which reached speeds in excess of 65 miles per hour, pursuits 
involving inexperienced operators such as juvenile suspects, and pursuits which were 
originally initiated for the violation of speeding, reckless driving, avoiding or fleeing a 
traffic safety checkpoint, no or expired registration plates or suspicion of driving under 
the influence.   
The results of the logistic regressions concluded that two measures were 
determined to have some predictive value in determining whether collisions occur.  The 
first involves pursuits with three or more police units participating in the pursuit.  The 
results indicate that this increases the likelihood for collisions to occur.  This is 
reasonable because when more than one police unit is placed in proximity to the suspect 
vehicle, it increases the likelihood of collisions (Alpert, 1997).  Conversely, the risk of 
collision decreases when a LEO deploys a tire deflation device against the suspect’s 
vehicle.  The results suggest that this intervention technique decreases the chance for 
collision.  This is also sensible.  Once a suspect vehicle travels over a tire deflation device 
(i.e., Stingers or Stop Sticks) they begin to lose air pressure in their tires.  This typically 
occurs without causing a blowout or sudden loss of control and usually results in an 
immediate decrease in speed (Federal Signal, 2017; Stop Stick, 2019).  This can decrease 
the potential for collision and substantially increase safety for all those involved.  
Additionally, pursuits that were initiated for reckless driving by the suspect present some 
potential for predicting collisions.  Surprisingly, none of the measures identified were 
useful in predicting injuries.   
The factors identified as statistically significant predictors of collisions for the 
KSP may be generalizable across law enforcement agencies.  Especially, agencies of 
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comparable size, structure, and pursuit practices.  Further, based upon the literature some 
if not all the factors identified in other studies may present the potential for pursuit-
related negative outcomes for law enforcement agencies.  The policy recommendations 
section provides a comprehensive overview of potential remedies to the predictors 
identified in this study and some pertaining to the contributing factors as identified in the 
literature. 
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This section builds upon the findings of this study and the literature reviewed 
regarding pursuit-related collisions to provide policy recommendations.  These 
recommendations may be generalizable across many types of law enforcement agencies 
and assist in mitigating the risk behaviors associated with pursuits.  Recommendations 
include assessment, management and accountability, risk behavior management, 
developing effective pursuit policy, compliance with pursuit policy and enhancing pursuit 
training practices.    
Alpert and Dunham (1990) set the stage for the pursuit policy recommendations.  
They suggest that a four-stage process be established by law enforcement agencies.  This 
process includes the following four components:  1) the establishment of a 
comprehensive pursuit policy, 2) comprehensive and practical pursuit training, 3) 
adequate supervision and monitoring of pursuits and 4) ownership and accountability of 
those involved.  Based upon the results of this study, pursuit literature and review of KSP 
Pursuit and Emergency Response Driving policy, the following specific 
recommendations are offered to the KSP.   
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Annual Pursuit Evaluation 
 
Hutson et al. (2007) suggested that all law enforcement agencies conduct an 
annual evaluation of all pursuit-related statistical information collected by the agency for 
a thorough analysis.  Annual reviews are currently being conducted by the KSP which 
collects pursuit data with this intent.  However, these annual evaluations should include 
improved categorical data collection including many of the areas addressed in the 
literature and included in the study.  These additional categories may include 
characteristics of the suspect and LEO, environmental factors, vehicle information and 
contributing factors involved in pursuit-related collisions and injuries.  Further, national 
data can provide valuable information regarding collisions, safety-related behaviors, and 
other transportation matters which may prove beneficial in the examination of pursuits 
(Fridell, 2004).  These annual pursuit evaluations are not always conducted in a timely 
manner by the KSP.  Efforts should be made to ensure these annual evaluations are 
completed on schedule and any findings are disseminated promptly to all personnel of 
interest.   
 
Proper Pursuit Mentality 
 
This study did not assess the mental state of each LEO engaged in the pursuit 
however, this has been a focus of some research.  For some LEOs, mental aspects such as 
maturity and attitude have also been noted as important factors in collision reduction.  
Chu (2016) suggests that younger LEOs should be paired with senior LEOs as a form of 
informal supervision during emergency situations and pursuits.  Senior LEOs are likely to 
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possess maturity and be more skillful in evaluating risk during these situations.  Based 
upon his research in Illinois, Auten (1991) suggested that practical behind-the-wheel 
training was important but the more important aspect in collision reduction is instilling 
the proper driver attitude (Auten, 1991).   Pairing officers is not a reasonable option for 
state police agencies however addressing the driving culture and associated attitudes are.   
Alpert (1996) found that the police experienced an adrenaline high when pursuing 
a suspect.  This adrenaline high can lead to errors during the pursuit and the use of 
excessive force against the fleeing suspect when LEOs make first contact.  A LEO must 
be conditioned to control emotion and remain in control throughout the duration of the 
pursuit.   
Yates (2004) suggests that the “contempt of cop” mentality often prevails while 
engaged in pursuits.  This mentality occurs when LEOs pursue with the intent to 
apprehend the suspect with little or no concern for public safety.  A LEO’s attitude and 
disposition is extremely important to efficiency in all aspects of policing (Yates, 2004) 
including decreasing collisions.  The KSP should continue to promote a proper driver 
attitude and create a culture which values the safe operation of patrol vehicles.   
 
Decision-Making 
 
Equally important as a LEO’s maturity and attitude is their ability to make sound 
decisions.  The decision-making process of the LEO is often the most essential 
component in mitigating risk especially in agencies which leave the decision to pursue to 
the LEO.  The decision-making process to engage in vehicular pursuits may include the 
following: 
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Decision Point One:  Do the LEOs have approval to initiate a pursuit? 
 This decision may be based upon agency policy or procedures governing 
authority to initiate a pursuit. 
Decision Point Two: Should the pursuit continue beyond its initial moment? 
 This decision may be also be influenced by agency policy, the totality of 
circumstances governing the pursuit and supervisory oversight. 
Decision Point Three:  Should LEOs from other agencies become involved? 
 This is typically a supervisory decision based upon the necessary support 
and the location of the pursuit and the direction it is heading which 
factors into concerns of jurisdiction and authority. 
Decision Point Four: What strategies, tactics, or techniques can be used to  stop 
the fleeing vehicle? 
 The decision to take appropriate action to end the pursuit is often made by 
the pursuing LEO, monitoring supervision in conjunction with policy and 
procedural mandates. 
Decision Point Five: Should the pursuit be terminated? 
 This decision of often the most important.  It hinges upon agency policy, 
the expertise of those involved and risks associated with the continuation 
of the pursuit (Oliver & Kirchhoff, 2017).   
  
This is a simple illustration of the decision-making process for LEOs during a 
standard pursuit.  These decision points may be more difficult or skewed depending on 
the maturity and attitude of the pursuing LEO. 
While a material decision-making matrix may not be appropriate to add to a 
pursuit policy, they may be useful in training.  The KSP could integrate a decision-
making process to add clarity to the decision points present within a pursuit.  For 
instance, determining when to pursue and when to terminate at pursuit.   Or determining 
what type of pursuit intervention technique is most appropriate for the circumstances.  
Improved decision-making can only enhance officer safety during pursuits.  
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Top Speed 
 
Driving above the speed limit is a risk behavior that should be managed in pursuit 
driving.  While the top speed of the pursuit was not found to be significant as related to 
negative outcomes, most KSP pursuits were considered high speed at 66 miles per hour 
or greater.  Five (5%) percent of KSP pursuits were initiated for reckless driving.   
Greater speeds increase the chances of being involved in a negative outcome 
(Abdelwanis, 2013; Alpert, 1997; Rivara and Mack, 2004; Yager et al., 2015; Yates, 
2009).  Under this assumption, the KSP like most law enforcement agencies should begin 
pursuing avenues useful in ensuring their LEOs operate at reasonable speeds during 
pursuits.  In some instances, written policy can be used to regulate the speed traveled by 
LEOs by designating a reasonable point above the speed limit or authorized top speed.  
Continual training and education of the dangers of excessive speed may also prove 
useful.  Not only are collisions more likely at high speeds but the injuries resulting from 
these collisions have the potential to be much more severe (Gustafson, 2015).  Numerous 
sources identify speed as a contributing factor in pursuit related negative outcome 
therefore the KSP should continue to address speed and the exercise of reasonable control 
of patrol vehicles while in operation.   
 
Officer Distraction 
 
This study was unable to ascertain any measure suitable to measure the level of 
distraction experienced by KSP personnel involved in pursuits.  However, research 
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suggests that a strategy should be employed by law enforcement agencies which limits 
distraction experienced by LEOs engaged pursuits (Gustafson, 2015). 
Some authors suggest that human beings are unable to focus on more than one 
thing at a time (James & Vila, 2012).  Agencies like the KSP should establish restrictions 
on the use of devices which might divert attention away from the pursuit such as cellular 
phones.  Further, LEOs are often required to relay information about the pursuit to 
telecommunicators.  Installing technology like GPS trackers and black box transmitter 
technology may prove useful in decreasing the need for a LEO to relay as much 
information during an active pursuit.  This may not be a reasonable solution for many 
agencies due to the associated costs of technology.  However, any means of eliminating 
distractions which may be diverting a LEO’s attention to anything other than vehicle 
operation and the vehicle being pursued would be beneficial in reducing the likelihood of 
negative outcomes. 
 
Officer Fatigue 
 
 The data utilized for this study did not contain a measure that would assess the 
officer’s fatigue however some research has been conducted to examine the impact of 
fatigue on officer activities.  Some acknowledge that reducing the amount of fatigue 
LEOs experience should be another focal point (Gustafson, 2015).  
Obviously, law enforcement agencies cannot control a LEOs off-duty activities 
including how much rest they get during off-duty hours.  What they can control is how 
much and how often overtime is worked.  Additionally, supervision can regulate work 
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schedule hours such as work shift length, consecutive work days, total weekly hours and 
secondary employment.  Management possesses the discretion to deviate from these 
controls when reasonable and appropriate.  Fatigue management is a supervisory task and 
an essential one.  Supervision should take a vested interest in ensuring LEOs do not 
suffer from fatigue which can be a major officer safety concern and contributing factor 
associated with collisions (President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, 2015).  
Managing officer fatigue is a reasonable option for the KSP.  However, low staffing 
levels will make this challenging. 
  
Pursuit Intervention Techniques and Technology 
 
 Pursuit-related collisions and injuries are often a by-product of the pursuit 
intervention techniques.  Therefore, developing and implementing effective risk 
management strategies has the potential to prevent negative outcomes.   
 The KSP primarily utilizes three types of pursuit intervention techniques for 
which they collect data.  There are: 1) tire deflation devices, 2) rolling roadblocks and 3) 
legal intervention.  Tire deflation devices were utilized in (12%, N=154) of pursuit, 
rolling roadblocks were utilized in (4%, N=16) of pursuits, and legal intervention was 
utilized in (6%, N=53) of pursuits between 2009 and 2017.  As stated, legal intervention 
is an intentional act and therefore negative outcomes stemming from this technique were 
excluded from this study.  The use of tire deflation devices and rolling roadblocks were 
examined.  This study found the use of tire deflation devices to be a statistically 
significant in decreasing the likelihood the pursuit ends in collision.  Neither tire deflation 
devices nor rolling roadblocks were found to be significant as related to injuries.     
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 The decision to employ a pursuit intervention technique and the selections of 
which technique is most appropriate is extremely important in mitigating risk and the 
potential for negative outcomes.  Overall, the best pursuit intervention tactic and risk 
behavior management strategy is to avoid pursuits all together.  However, tire deflation 
devices, GPS trackers and helicopters are considered less risky.   
Tire deflation devices such as “Stingers” and “Stop Sticks” are commonplace in 
most law enforcement agencies.  They present a low-cost option to mitigate risk and are 
typically contained within the trunk of most patrol vehicles.  They are designed to deflate 
vehicle tires in a controlled manner thereby ending the pursuit with limited risk of 
collision (Miller, 1993).  Overall, tire deflation devices are one of the safest intervention 
techniques to employ. 
GPS tracker technology has also proven to be a very effective means of mitigating 
pursuits.  The StarChase system is a commercial off-the-shelf system which was 
developed and based upon the conclusion of a National Institute of Justice (NIJ) report by 
Alpert (1997).  In this report, Alpert (1997) concluded that once tagged by StarChase and 
the pursuing LEOs terminate the pursuit.  Then the suspect in most cases will slow within 
a minute as if they are free from the police (Gaither, Gabriele, Andersen, Healy, & Hung, 
2017).  The StarChase system includes a control panel which is assessable from inside 
the LEO’s vehicle.  From this control panel, a LEO can arm, aim and fire as GPS tracker 
device at the fleeing vehicle.  Once the GPS tracker is in place, the pursuit can be 
terminated allowing LEOs to locate the fleeing vehicle in a safer manner.  In a study of 
36 agencies, Alpert (1997) found the StarChase system to be successful more than 80 
percent of the time in leading police to suspects.  Weather was determined to be a factor 
 57 
 
in unsuccessful deployments of the StarChase system (Gaither et al., 2017; Oliver & 
Kirchhoff, 2017). 
Helicopters provide the ability to track a pursued vehicle from the air allowing 
pursuit units to maintain a safe distance and trail speed.  This allows agencies to promote 
public safety while monitoring the fleeing vehicle and eventually apprehending the 
suspect in a safer manner (Oliver & Kirchhoff, 2017).     
Other intervention techniques, which are considered more risky exist for LEOs as 
well.  Boxing, channeling and the Grappler system are some of these pursuit intervention 
techniques.   Some agencies such as the KSP utilize techniques similar to boxing and 
channeling and refer to them as rolling roadblocks.     
The boxing technique occurs when LEOs surround the suspect vehicle with their 
patrol vehicles to restrict movement.  Channeling involves creating the illusion of an 
escape route for the suspect vehicle which is in reality a pathway to a designated “take 
down” location.  In creating this illusion, LEOs direct the suspect to a location such as a 
parking lot, unpaved area or dead end by way of barriers such as their pursuit vehicles, 
tractor-trailers or barricades.  Once these barriers are in place, the suspect sees the 
singular unobstructed “escape route” which they voluntarily accept before ultimately 
being corralled in a safer location designated for apprehension (Miller, 1993).   
Another form of more risky pursuit intervention is the Grappler Police Bumper 
system (Grappler).  The Grappler is a device which is attached to the front bumper of a 
police vehicle.  When ready to deploy, the LEO must close in on the rear of the suspect 
vehicle.  When in position, the LEO will lower the Grappler device and drive it into the 
rear wheel (s) of the suspect vehicle.  Upon contact, the netting straps from the Grappler 
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device secure themselves to the rear wheel (s) and immobilizes them.  This process can 
operate with the netting straps tethered to the police unit or they can be detached at will.  
The Grappler system is not without risk because it requires that the police vehicle be 
placed in proximity to suspect vehicle thereby increasing the chance of negative 
outcomes.  However, this intervention technique does decrease the chance of serious 
negative outcomes (Grappler, 2019).    
Boxing, channeling and the Grappler system are considered riskier than tire 
deflation devices, GPS trackers and helicopters.  These techniques increase the potential 
for negative outcomes however, they present significantly less risk than terminating a 
pursuit with vehicle to vehicle use of force.       
As a pursuit progresses and more information is gathered, a decision may be made 
that circumstances necessitate a need to terminate a pursuit by force.  In this case, 
determining the type of force (i.e., pursuit intervention technique) to employ should be 
done with extreme prejudice.  Vehicle to vehicle intervention techniques are considered a 
higher-level use of force due to the potential for serious injury or death.  Once the 
decision is made that the pursuit must be terminated immediately, a tactical decision can 
be made to deploy “legal intervention” in a location likely to result in the least amount of 
collateral damage.  Legal intervention employed by most agencies is called a Pursuit 
Intervention Technique (P.I.T.) or Tactical Vehicle Intervention (T.V.I.).  This is an 
iteration of the ramming technique and is considered high risk.  Ramming occurs when 
the pursuit vehicle intentionally drives into the suspect vehicle to make it stop (Miller, 
1993).  The P.I.T. technique is conducted by the pursuing LEO driving their front bumper 
into the rear quarter panel of the suspect’s vehicle.  Once contact is made, the pursuing 
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LEO accelerates and turns into the suspect’s vehicle.  The maneuver causes a loss of tire 
traction.  In many cases, this causes the vehicle’s engine to shut down ending the pursuit.  
This can also result in the suspect vehicle losing traction resulting in a “spin out” thereby 
immobilizing the vehicle (Miller, 1993).  Vehicle to vehicle intervention techniques are 
important to mention because of the frequency of use and its relevance this discussion.  
As discussed, these techniques fall outside of the scope of collisions as defined in this 
study because they are an intentional act by the authorities. 
 Each of these risk behavior management strategies and other considerations 
presented in this section have the potential to impact the rate of negative outcomes 
resulting from pursuits.  The next section will examine considerations for the 
development of effective pursuit policy.  
 
  
Developing Effective Pursuit Policy 
Negative outcomes associated with vehicular pursuits may be fiscally harmful to 
taxpayers and law enforcement agencies alike.  Law enforcement agencies value the 
promotion of professional standards within their ranks.  A well-written pursuit policy has 
the potential to regulate LEO behaviors and become a useful mechanism to assist in 
pursuit management.      
Fennessy et al. (1970) classified police pursuit policy into three different 
categories:  1) officer judgment model; 2) restrictive model; 3) and model of 
discouragement or prohibition.  Territo (1982) recommended the development of a 
pursuit policy which implemented controls on the operation of police vehicles and other 
emergency equipment.   
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Policy development is often driven by risk management and liability concerns 
(Alpert and Smith, 1994).  Policy can be defined as:  a course of action or inaction chosen 
by public authorities to address a given problem or interrelated set of problems.  Policy is 
a course of action that is anchored in a set of values regarding appropriate public goals 
and a set of beliefs about the best way of achieving those goals. (Pal, 2001). 
Modifications to pursuit policy should also be considered as a means of enhancing 
pursuit response.  Policy modification may increase or decrease the potential for pursuits 
relative to the language contained within (Alpert, 1997; Alpert, Kenney, Dunham, & 
Smith, 2000).  Alpert (1997) noted that pursuits decreased in Miami-Dade when, in 1992, 
they amended their policy to restrict pursuits to violent felonies only.  Their pursuit totals 
dropped 82 percent and subsequently collisions and injuries also decreased.  Conversely, 
Omaha amended their policy to allow pursues to be initiated solely at the LEO’s 
discretion in 1993.  This resulted in a 600 percent increase in pursuits within the first year 
of implementation.  Clearly, policy can have a significant impact on the frequency of 
pursuits.  The KSP operates under the premise of trooper discretion like Omaha does.   
Setting clear parameters for pursuit driving is extremely important.  Not only can 
pursuit policy regulate speed, but it can also offer guidelines for all types of response 
driving.  Parameters should be set regarding how, when, and where pursuits are 
authorized.  Policy should be extremely specific covering the guidelines for initiating and 
terminating pursuits, the number of police units involved, the use of intervention 
techniques, and firearm usage (Hess & Wrobleski, 2006).  Training for LEOs regarding 
these standards should be provided once they are developed.  LEOs will benefit from 
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consistency and standardization of driving expectations (Gustafson, 2015) during a 
pursuit. 
For law enforcement agencies, pursuit policy can vary from one end of the 
spectrum to the other.  Some have adopted a “chase-them-all” policy while others have 
restricted pursuits to felonies only or a “no chase” policy (Hess & Wrobleski, 2006).  The 
development of a nationwide pursuit policy has been proposed by some but is not 
probable due to the vastness and diversity of the United States (Hicks, 2006).   
 Tiesman and Heick’s (2014) conducted a study of pursuit policy restrictions 
among Iowa LEOs.  They found most agencies required all LEOs to wear seatbelts.  They 
also found additional restrictions regarding vehicle speed and the use of mobile phone 
and similar devices while operating a vehicle.  Sharp (2003) surveyed 30 randomly 
selected law enforcement agencies of varying sizes.  Sharp found that 83 percent of these 
agencies restricted a LEO’s ability to engage in a pursuit.  Ninety-three percent limited 
the number of police vehicles allowable in the pursuit to not more than two.   
The KSP currently has a well-written comprehensive pursuit policy.  While it is 
unreasonable to expect any pursuit policy to address every possible contingency, their 
policy does provide guidance in most areas.  It regulates where pursuits are authorized, 
the number of police units permitted, restricted zones, parameters for termination and 
requirements for supervisor approval.  Overall, KSP’s General Order OM-B-15 Pursuit 
and Emergency Response Driving, OM-B-15a Legal Intervention & Tire Deflation 
Devices, and OM-B-14 Roadblocks policy would be considered less restrictive by most 
standards.  Further, it allows for considerably officer discretion regarding pursuits.  
Considering that the rates of collisions and injuries have been trending upward since 
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2009, it may be prudent for KSP leadership to examine all aspects of KSP pursuit 
practices including policy.  The KSP could provide more specific language as deemed 
appropriate by the KSP legal staff involving acceptable speed parameters, criteria for 
initiating a pursuit and decision-making regarding the appropriate use of pursuit 
intervention techniques.  It is not enough for law enforcement agencies to detail these 
instructions in policy.  LEO’s must adhere to these policies for them to be effective. 
 
Compliance with Pursuit Policy 
 
While pursuit policy development is extremely important, it does little to effect 
positive change if it is not understood and adhered to.  Further, under-reporting the 
initiation of pursuits by LEOs seems to be the most significant administrative concern 
when policies become more restrictive.  Therefore, it is recommended that sanctions be 
detailed in policy and imposed for those LEOs who violate pursuit guidelines (Payne & 
Fenske, 1997). 
The nature of police work requires most LEOs to work autonomously without 
direct oversight from supervision.  This has the potential to lead to problems in ensuring 
compliance with policy (Rubinstein, 1973).  Hansen, Rojek, Wolfe, and Alpert, (2015) 
conducted a study to assess the potential of the imposition of discipline for violations of 
agency driving policy resulting in vehicular collisions.  The logic behind this study was 
deterrent-based in nature and built upon the work of White (2001).  The findings support 
Alpert and Dunham’s (1990) recommendation for ownership and accountability.     
Over time as pursuit policies have become more restrictive, LEOs who believe 
their ability to engage in vehicular pursuits and apprehend violators is an essential 
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component in crime-fighting may be more resistant in complying with restrictive pursuit 
policy.  Whether more stringent policies result in non-compliance is an important 
determination to be made.  This determination is important for two reasons:  1) litigation 
against a department typically involves the lack of adherence to policy and 2) pursuit 
management improvement including reporting can decrease negative implications (Crew 
et al., 1994).  Some are concerned with accurate reporting procedures (Crew et al., 1995).  
To receive policy compliance, LEOs must be held accountable for failing to comply with 
assigned mandates.  New policy has little chance to effect positive change if LEOs are 
not held accountable for failing to comply (Gustafson, 2015).   
Crew et al. (1994) found that the creation of more restrictive pursuit policy will 
result in fewer pursuits taking place but did not increase non-compliance with 
requirements to report.  Crew et al. (1995) found that more restrictive pursuit policies did 
not increase non-compliance in the requirement to report the initiation of the pursuit.  
Conversely, Falcone et al. (1992) found that policy amendments resulted in the under-
reporting of pursuit initiations in Illinois and Michigan.  Similarly, Britz and Payne 
(1994) found substantial evidence of unreported pursuits which lead to high collisions 
rates in Illinois and Michigan. 
 In addition to the concerns regarding amendments to policy, there may be other 
reasons LEOs chose to under-report pursuits to supervision.  A LEO’s decision to report 
may involve:  fear of discipline, fear of litigation or the awareness that agency pursuit 
policy has been violated (Payne & Corley, 1994).  There are mixed results whether 
amendments result in under-reporting.  However, it can be deduced that the development 
of a well-written vehicular pursuit policy can present a cumulative positively effect.  
 64 
 
Once effective policy has been developed, it must be followed up by clear and concise 
training for all affected personnel.   
The KSP could look to establish criteria for pursuit policy violations above and 
beyond their current standards of conduct.  But this would be contingent upon the agency 
determining that a more restrictive pursuit policy is warranted. 
 
Developing an Effective Pursuit Training Program 
   
Pursuit training in an important aspect of safe vehicle operation during a pursuit 
and can positively impact the frequency of collisions and injuries.  Simply put, training 
improves operator performance which impacts negative outcomes.  This is especially true 
of highly complex tasks (Schneider, 1985).  Pursuit training of the past may have 
contained the catch them at any cost attitude mitigated with some concern for officer 
safety (Kroeker & McCoy, 1998).  Later training included an emphasis on the concern for 
the safety of the LEO, the suspect and public safety.  Initial training focused on physical 
skills orientation (Basham, 1978; Clark, 1976; Dougherty, 1961; International 
Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), 1965, 1968; Schultz, 1979; & Traffic Institute, 
1981).  Training later evolved to include an emphasis on policy concerns, restrictions and 
additional skills development (Auten, 1985; Auten, 1991; Fyfe, 1989; Halloran, 1985).         
 Although pursuits are considered high risk, pursuit training by departments is 
sparse or non-existent.  Alpert (1997) found that 60 percent of the agencies provide basic 
pursuit training while in the academy, but little else afterwards.  Post academy training 
for vehicular pursuits averaged just over three hours annually.  He also found that mid-
size departments (501 to 2,500 LEOs) provided less pursuit training than smaller 
 65 
 
departments yet experienced more pursuit-related collisions (Alpert, 1997). This is 
consistent with the KSP which only provides pursuit training during basic academy 
training. 
 Proficiency in driving requires both skills training and cognitive conditioning 
such as psychomotor skills and decision-making abilities (Dorn, 2010; Dorn & Barker, 
2005).  LEOs that engage in risk-taking behaviors while driving may contribute to 
negative outcomes.  The University of Illinois study conducted by Auten (1991) 
referenced earlier in this paper concluded with a need ". . . to expand upon the currently 
existing body of knowledge concerning police pursuit driving operations" (Auten, 1991, 
p. 13).  In his findings, Auten (1991) determined that for police driver training courses to 
be effective, they should include practical exercises which includes rigorous behind-the-
wheel exercises.  Similarly, in a study conducted by the United States Department of 
Transportation they concluded that training needed to be comprehensive including 
practical as well as classroom instruction (Charles & Falcone, 1992).  Emergency Vehicle 
Operations Course (EVOC) with a pursuit response driving component and even driving 
simulators can fulfill this recommendation.   
While training and technology are extremely important in orchestrating an 
effective pursuit, emotional control and mental preparation is also integral.  Auten (1991) 
also emphasized the need to instill recruits and experienced LEOs with the proper 
attitude.  Abbott (1988) argued that more collisions result from LEOs which possess an 
improper driver attitude than from their lack of driver skill.  Likewise, Daniels and 
Spratley (2003) stated that in terms of training, the single most important skill is a LEO’s 
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mindset and ability to think ahead and consider options for safely ending the pursuit 
(Daniels & Spratley, 2003). 
Utilizing pursuit continuums and conducting mental and practical training using 
these continuums is one way to develop a standard mindset in LEOs.  Some departments 
utilized such continuums to align the options available to LEOs engaged in a pursuit in 
relation to the threat posed by the suspect being pursued.  One such continuum, the 
Pursuit Management Continuum was developed by Ashley (2000).  This continuum 
accounted for and labeled the known threat posed by the suspect and the corresponding 
control level of the LEO into three categories from the least to greatest (Ashley, 2000).   
Some departments such as the KSP do not adhere steadfast to a continuum of 
“acceptable” behaviors and actions as a component of pursuit management.  Some 
agencies leave pursuit decisions to the discretion of the LEO and supervision involved in 
the pursuit (LEMAS, 2013; Reaves, 2017).  Further, establishing pursuit continuums and 
requiring agency staff to adhere to the continuum via policy can open an agency up to 
legal liability and scrutiny if a LEO is required to deviate from the set standards based on 
a spur-of-the-moment decision (Ashley, 2000).  
When training an officer to pursue, serious consideration should be given to the 
perspective presented by Alpert (1997) and Dunham, Alpert, Kenny, and Cromwell 
(1998).  They argue that in most instances, the absence of “pressuring” will result in the 
suspects either slowing or stopping once they no longer feel that they are being pursued.  
Pressuring occurs as a result of being actively involved in a pursuit and subjected to the 
psychological stresses felt as a result of the flashing lights, blaring sirens and heightened 
emotional state (Best, 2005).  If a means of tracking the suspect is available, knowledge 
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of the effects of pressuring can present a safer means to pursuit resolution for all parties 
involved.  Clearly, this should become a focal point in pursuit training, so it can be 
factored into the calculus of LEOs and supervisors involved in or monitoring a pursuit. 
   Proficiency in police-related skills such as driving, and firearms usage are 
diminishable and require training to maintain or improve proficiency.  Without consistent 
and repeated training, these skills weaken over time (Yates, 2004).  Some may argue 
agencies lack the time or resources to conduct the appropriate levels of training for their 
LEO.  When comparing pursuit response driver training to mandatory firearms training, 
the likelihood of being involved in either incident is relatively equal.  However, driver 
training for vehicular pursuits is rarely conducted after basic academy training.  Yet 
LEOs spend a considerable amount of their time operating a vehicle.  Conversely, 
firearms training is conducted at least annually by most law enforcement agencies and 
LEOs rarely discharge their firearm.  
The KSP conducts over 40 hours of practical high-speed emergency response and 
pursuit driver training during basic academy training.  This training is conducted at the 
NCM Motosports Park Speedway in Bowling Green Kentucky.   The KSP does not 
currently offer any pursuit training after the academy.  It is recommended that the KSP 
provide practical and comprehensive pursuit training on a reoccurring basis.     
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE STUDIES 
 
 This study could have been more robust if it included a larger span of years.  The 
inclusion of additional data could present a clearer picture of the trends under 
examination.  Additionally, there were limits in the quality and consistency of the data 
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collected and utilized in this study.  This limitation became apparent when creating the 
data set for this study.  It was determined that some data was missing from the annual 
SPB spreadsheets which may have occurred for a couple of reasons.  This could have 
occurred because all the data collected from the Teletypes was not transposed on to a 
spreadsheet by the SPB.    Or, certain pursuit data was not requested through the CAD 
Teletype template for a certain year and therefore was not collected and available to be 
added to the SPB spreadsheet.  The data set created for this study was largely developed 
from the data collected on the annual SPB spreadsheets.   
For these reasons, the total number of pursuits examined in this study does not 
match the total number of pursuits occurring for the year 2011.  There were a total 116 
pursuits that occurred in 2011 while only 108 are represented in this data set.  Each of the 
totals for the other years under study matched exactly.  
Further, several years from 2009 to 2014 do not contain the same CAD Teletype 
template categories therefore some data was not collected consistently each year.  
Calendar years 2012-2014 did not contain the category “Rolling Road Block Used”.   
Calendar year 2011 did not contain the categories: Subject Resisted Arrest; Subject Fled 
after Traffic Stop; Subject Died; Rolling Road Block Used.  Calendar year 2010 did not 
contain categories: Subject Resisted Arrest; Subject Fled after Traffic Stop; Subject Died; 
Rolling Road Block Used and Injuries Sustained.  Calendar year 2009 did not contain 
many categories including Subject Resisted Arrest; Subject Fled after Traffic Stop; 
Subject Died; Rolling Road Block Used; Injuries Sustained; Subject Fled on Foot; Legal 
Intervention was Used; Duration of the Pursuit; Termination of the Pursuit; Reason for 
Termination of the Pursuit.   
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Another limitation of this study was the absence of identifying characteristics 
pertaining to the suspects or the officers involved in the pursuits. Officer and suspect 
characteristics were not included in this study because this information was not available.  
The only identifying characteristics collected by the KSP was the LEO’s name and 
whether the suspect was a juvenile.  Therefore, no specific individual data was included 
in this study. 
This study can serve as a basis for future studies involving the KSP or other law 
enforcement agencies.  Future studies with the KSP should include a larger span of years, 
more consistent categorical data collection from year to year, the collection of categorical 
data addressed in the literature, and the collection of some identifying characteristics of 
those involved.  The additional categorical data suggested in the literature may include 
measures for the LEO’s mental state (i.e., driver attitude) during the pursuit, an 
assessment of the LEO decision-making during the pursuit, any distraction experienced 
by the LEO during the pursuit and whether the LEO was fatigued prior to initiating the 
pursuit.      
CONCLUSION 
 In conclusion, law enforcement agencies are likely to continue engaging in 
vehicular pursuits for any number of reasons.  Therefore, a certain amount of risk is 
unavoidable.  However, when law enforcement agencies take risk seriously and entertain 
opportunities to minimize those identified risks, a higher level of safety may be obtained.  
Conclusions have been drawn from the findings of this study which address the research 
questions.   
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In response to research question number one, the finding from this study indicates 
an upward trend in the amount of pursuit-related collisions and pursuit-related injuries.  
Results of this kind do not provide a definitive answer regarding why there is an upward 
trend.  They only confirm the direction of the trend.  Further study is required to 
determine potential causes for this upward trend in pursuit-related collision and injuries 
within the KSP. 
Research question two identified the contributing factors found to be predictors of 
collisions.  This study concluded that having three or more units involved in a pursuit 
increases the likelihood for collision.  It was also determined that the use of tire deflation 
devices decrease the likelihood for pursuit to end in collision.   None of the selected 
predictors were significant regarding injuries.     
KSP policy currently contains language restricting pursuits to a “maximum of two 
(2) agency vehicles in immediate pursuit”.  For a significant decrease in collisions and 
injuries to occur within the KSP, risk management strategies should be employed by the 
KSP to examine the identified statistically significant contributing factor and others 
identified in the literature.    The following areas were identified as potential risk 
management strategies:  1) mitigate contributing factors and risk behaviors to what extent 
possible during pursuits; 2) expand upon and examine the need to make pursuit policy 
more comprehensive and restrictive based upon the needs of the agency which may 
include limiting officer discretion; 3) conduct practical pursuit training on a reoccurring 
basis; 4) improve pursuit monitoring by supervision to ensure compliance with policy; 
and 5) increase accountability by LEOs found to have violated pursuit policy.   
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 As with most initiatives for process improvement, training and education is a 
starting point.  Pursuit training must include educating all personnel on the agency pursuit 
policy once it has been revised and approved.  Emergency response driving may also be a 
main component of this training.  Similar to pursuit driving, emergency response driving 
is a diminishable skill. Therefore, providing proficient and continual training is 
paramount to ensure all personnel possess the driver skill, proper driver attitude, and 
knowledge essential to ensuring safe, yet effective vehicle pursuit practices.  Enhanced 
supervisor oversight of pursuits and officer accountability is important in ensuring 
responsible actions are taking and that those exhibiting irresponsibility are held 
accountable.  Otherwise, implementing positive change has little chance of success.  
Pursuit operations should seamlessly meld with policy and training.  Employing pursuit 
intervention techniques are also an area requiring attention.  As noted, some techniques 
present a high likelihood than others for collisions and injuries to occur.  Lastly, the 
safety of the officer and safety of the public should remain the primary concern in pursuit 
operations.  When this focus shifts to other areas, or a subculture exists within law 
enforcement agencies which contradicts this ideal, the potential exists for a law 
enforcement agency to experience increasing trends in pursuit-related collisions and 
injuries. 
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